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Privacy and Regulatory Innovation:
Moving Beyond Voluntary Codes
IRA S. RUBINSTEIN*
Abstract: According to its many critics, privacy self-
regulation is a failure. It suffers from an overall lack of
transparency, weak or incomplete realization of the Fair
Information Practice Principles, inadequate incentives to
ensure wide-scale industry participation, and ineffective
compliance and enforcement mechanisms. Rather than
attacking or defending self-regulation, this Article explores
co-regulatory approaches in which government plays a role
in setting requirements for industry guidelines and
imposing sanctions for non-compliance. It examines
innovative policy tools such as regulatory covenants and
develops a normative framework for evaluating self-
regulatory mechanisms. It then considers four case studies,
including a voluntary code governing online behavioral
advertising practices, a government-negotiated program
enabling data flows between Europe and the U.S., a
statutory safe harbor program designed to protect
children's privacy, and a variety of privacy covenants. This
Article argues that while statutory safe harbors have many
strengths and privacy covenants offer the promise of
achieving even better results, both would benefit from being
redesigned. Finally, it offers specific policy
recommendations: (i) to the FTC on how it might begin to
use the covenanting approach to experiment with
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innovative technologies and address hard problems such as
online behavioral advertising; and (2) to Congress on how
best to structure new safe harbor programs as an essential
component of omnibus consumer privacy legislation. All of
these approaches to regulatory innovation move beyond
purely voluntary codes in favor of co-regulatory solutions.
INTRODUCTION
Privacy policy in the U.S. has long relied on a combination of
sectoral law, market forces, and self-regulation. Over the years, the
Department of Commerce (DOC) and the Federal Trade Commission(FTC) have expressly favored a self-regulatory approach. They argue
that self-regulation can protect privacy in a more flexible and cost-
effective manner than direct regulation without impeding the rapid
pace of innovation in Internet-related businesses.
Privacy self-regulation generally involves a trade association or
group of firms establishing substantive rules concerning the
collection, use, and transfer of personal information, and procedures
for applying these rules to member firms.i But, to its many critics, self-
regulation in the form of such voluntary codes has been a failure.2 It
suffers from an overall lack of accountability and transparency,
incomplete realization of the Fair Information Practice Principles
(FIPPs),3 free rider issues, and weak oversight and enforcement.
l See Peter P. Swire, Markets, Self-Regulation, and Government Enforcement in the
Protection ofPersonal Information, in PRIVACY AND SELF-REGULATION IN THE
INFORMATION AGE (U.S. Dep't of Commerce ed., 1997), available at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/privacy/selfregl.htm.
2See infia Part II.
3 FIPPs are the basis for modern privacy regulation, but have been challenged in recent
years by privacy scholars and technologists. See infra note 202 and accompanying text.
There are different formulations of FIPPs, which vary as to both the number of principles
and their substantive content. The original formulation dates from the early 1970s. See
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., RECORDS, COMPUTERS AND THE RIGHTS OF
CITIZENS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMMEITEE ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL
DATA SYSTEMS (1973), available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/datcncl/1973privacy/tocprefacemembers.htm. A recent U.S.
government formulation includes eight principles (transparency, individual participation,
purpose specification, data minimization, use limitation, data quality and integrity,
security, and accountability and auditing). See U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY
POLICY GUIDANCE MEMORuANM: THE FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICE PRINCIPLES:
FRAMEWORK FOR PRIVACY POLICY AT THE DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (2008), available
at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy policyguide 2008-01.pdf .
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Indeed, privacy self-regulation has been derided as chimera whose
real purpose is to avoid government regulation.4 More often than not,
these same critics call upon Congress to intervene in the online
marketplace by enacting comprehensive privacy legislation. Under
this enforcement model of regulation, Congress would define
substantive privacy requirements for commercial firms based on
FIPPs and authorize agency regulation as supplemented over time by
court decisions interpreting their requirements. The legislation would
also spell out which agencies have enforcement authority, what
remedies are available, and whether individuals have a private right of
action to recover damages for any injuries they might suffer when a
firm violates the law.s
The opposing sides in the privacy debate tend to view self-
regulation and government regulation as if they were mutually
exclusive options from which policy makers had to choose either one
or the other. But this is short-sighted. Modern regulatory theory treats
self-regulation as a "highly malleable term which may encompass a
wide variety of instruments."6 Thus, it is better to think of voluntary
codes and direct government regulation as opposing ends of a
regulatory continuum, with most self-regulatory schemes falling
somewhere in the middle. Rather than attacking or defending familiar
forms of privacy self-regulation, this Article explores a different way of
thinking about self-regulation based on the idea of "co-regulation." In
co-regulatory approaches, industry enjoys considerable flexibility in
shaping self-regulatory guidelines, while government sets default
requirements and retains general oversight authority to approve and
enforce these guidelines.7 This approach to privacy self-regulation has
much in common with the idea of a privacy safe harbor, which
Congress first introduced in the Children's Online Privacy Protection
Act of 1998 (COPPA), but re-designs it in several critical ways.
Although American scholars and regulators have previously
studied the uses and limitations of self-regulation in achieving
4See A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1524-27 (2000);
CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., PRIVACY SELF-REGULATION: A DECADE OF
DISAPPOINTMENT 11 (2005), available at http://epic.org/reports/decadedisappoint.pdf
5 See Swire, supra note 1.
6 Darren Sinclair, Self-Regulation Versus Command and Control? Beyond False
Dichotomies, 19 LAW & POL'Y 529, 532 (1997); see also Neil Gunningham & Joseph Rees,
Industry Self-Regulation: An Institutional Perspective, 19 LAw & POL'Y 363,363(1997).
7 See Sinclair, supra note 6, at 544
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information privacy,8 they have thus far given little systematic
attention to safe harbors or co-regulatory initiatives generally.9 This
Article argues that co-regulation, including privacy safe harbors, is an
effective and flexible policy instrument that, if properly designed,
offers several advantages as compared to the false dichotomy of
voluntary industry guidelines versus prescriptive government
regulation. First, the existing COPPA safe harbor, without any
modification, deals successfully with virtually all of the standard
criticisms of self-regulation.o Second, by allowing greater flexibility in
structuring self-regulatory frameworks, Congress can enable the FTC
to experiment with policy innovations such as Privacy-Enhancing
Technologies (PETs) and new ways of implementing FIPPs to better
address difficult issues such as behavioral advertising." Finally, by
using the right combination of sticks and carrots to re-design privacy
safe harbors, Congress can encourage much broader industry
participation, thereby ensuring a baseline level of monitoring and
dispute resolution, while allowing the FTC to devote its scarce
enforcement resources to the most egregious or systemic privacy
abuses.12
Why does this matter? For the first time in ten years, Congress
seems ready to revisit comprehensive online privacy legislation.
Leading technology firms have voiced support for a privacy law and
have joined with privacy groups to draft model legislation.13 The
House Committee on Energy and Commerce held several hearings on
data privacy and security issues. In 2010, (former) Rep. Boucher
8See Swire, supra note 1.
9 One exception is Peter P. Swire, Reply: Safe Harbors and a Proposal to Improve the
Community Reinvestment Act, 79 VA. L. REV. 349, 371-78 (1993) (offering preliminary
thoughts towards a general theory of safe harbors as a regulatory mechanism). For a review
of European scholarship on co-regulation, see, e.g., HANS-BREDOW-INSTITUT, FINAL
REPORT: STUDY ON Co-REGULATION MEASURES IN THE MEDIA SECTOR (2006), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/docs/library/studies/coregul/final-rep en.pdf.
1o See infra, Part III.C.
11 See infra, Part IV.A and B.
2 See infra, PartIV.c.
13 See Joelle Tesler, Microsoft, Google Back Privacy Legislation, MSNBC (July 10, 2008),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/2562286 3 (last visited July 12, 2011).
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circulated a draft discussion bill'4 and Rep. Rush introduced a new
data privacy bill, H.R. 5777, which has since been reintroduced as
H.R. 611.15 If Congress enacts either bill, one might reasonably assume
that self-regulatory initiatives would fade away. But this need not be
the case. For example, the COPPA safe harbor provision sought to
encourage participation in self-regulatory programs by treating a
company that follows program guidelines as having complied with
statutory requirements.16 This is also not an isolated example. During
the io6th and lo7th Congresses, which were when the Senate and the
House last gave serious consideration to comprehensive privacy
legislation, several of the leading bills included provisions for a self-
regulatory safe harbor.1' While the Boucher draft discussion bill
includes a safe harbor provision exempting online advertisers from
certain consent requirements,' H.R. 611 includes a full-fledged safe
harbor program.'9 This Article argues that a safe harbor provision
would strengthen whatever bill emerges from current discussions and
further that consumers will enjoy a higher level of privacy protection
under redesigned, more innovative forms of safe harbors than if
Congress relied solely on the conventional enforcement model or
enacted no law at all.
14 See STAFF OF RICHARD BOUCHER, STAFF DISCUSSION DRAFT 8-19 (2010), available at
http://dataprivacy.foxrothschild.com/stats/pepper/orderedlist/downloads/download.php
?file=http%3A//dataprivacy.foxrothschild.com/uploads/file/PrivacyDraft 5-io.pdf
's See Best Practices Act, H.R. 5777, 111th Cong. (2010), available at
http://www.house.gov/rush/pdf/BPACT 004.pdf; see also Building Effective Strategies to
Promote Responsibility Accountability Choice Transparency Innovation Consumer
Expectations and Safeguards Act (BEST PRACTICES), H.R. 611, 112th Cong. (2011),
available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=112_cong _bills&docid= f:h6iih.txt.pdf
16 This is referred to as "deemed compliance." See infra, note 154 and accompanying text.
European and Australian privacy laws create a similar mix by requiring substantive
standards for the protection of personal data while also encouraging co-regulation with
industry sectors. See infra notes 172-176 and accompanying text.
17 See, e.g., Electronic Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 1999, H.R. 3321, io6th Cong. § 4 (1999);
Online Privacy Protection Act of 1999,S. 809, io6th Cong. § 3 (1999); Consumer Privacy
Protection Act of 2002, H.R. 4678, lo7th Cong. § io6 (2002); Online Personal Privacy Act,
S. 2201, 107th Cong. § 203 (2002).
18 See STAFF OF RICHARD BOUCHER, supra note 14, § 3(e).
'9 See H.R. 6ii, suprat note 15, §§ 401-04, which sets forth a Safe Harbor Self-Regulatory
Choice Program.
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The Article has four parts. Part I analyzes the privacy debate over
the past 15 years and shows that the differences between proponents
of voluntary codes and those favoring prescriptive regulation are
irreconcilable, largely due to reliance on the false dichotomy of
regulatory options. Next, Part II analyzes the various types of self-
regulation and describes a more collaborative, flexible, and
performance-based approach, drawing on critical insights from
environmental regulation. This Part concludes by articulating a
normative framework for assessing self-regulatory programs
consisting in six factors: efficiency, openness and transparency,
completeness, strategies to address free rider problems, oversight and
enforcement, and use of second-generation design features. Part III
then applies this normative framework to four case studies: the first is
a voluntary industry code aimed at online behavioral advertising
practices; the second is a government-sponsored safe harbor program
resulting from inter-governmental efforts to ensure data flows
between Europe and the U.S.; the third is a statutory safe harbor
under COPPA, which is designed to facilitate industry self-regulation
as a vital component of protecting children's privacy; and the fourth
explores privacy covenants. The assessment of these case studies
against the six factors leads to the conclusion that while statutory safe
harbors and privacy covenants are the most promising forms of self-
regulation, they still suffer from some critical weaknesses. Finally,
Part IV relies on the preceding analysis to propose more sophisticated
versions of privacy covenants and a revamped version of statutory safe
harbors. The Article concludes by recommending that Congress adopt
these new tools to help protect online consumer privacy.
I. THE PRIVACY DEBATE
When the Clinton Administration began to develop a regulatory
framework for electronic commerce and the Internet, it promoted self-
regulation as the preferred approach to protecting consumer privacy
online. Clinton officials believed that private sector leadership would
cause electronic commerce to flourish, and specifically supported
efforts "to implement meaningful, consumer-friendly, self-regulatory
privacy regimes" in combination with technology solutions.20 While
arguing that unnecessary regulation might distort market
developments by "decreasing the supply and raising the cost of
20 see wILLIAM J. CLINTON & ALBERT GORE, JR., A FRAMEWORK FOR GLOBAL ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE 18 (1997).
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products and services" or by failing to keep pace with "the break-neck
speed of change in technology,"21 they also asserted that if industry
failed to address privacy concerns through self-regulation and
technology, the pressure for a regulatory solution would increase.
Not surprisingly, industry embraced this view. For example, at a
1995 public privacy workshop, industry representatives cited three
reasons that regulating privacy would be counterproductive. First, it
would stifle innovation in a developing market. Second, it might drive
marketing activity off the Internet entirely by adding unnecessary
costs to online advertising. And third, it would interfere with the
market definition of consumer privacy preferences and the
appropriate industry response.2 2 Privacy advocates in attendance
expressed a contrary view, warning that self-regulation would remain
ineffective without enforceable privacy rights, which were necessary to
deter bad actors and outliers and ensure the widest possible
participation in any self-regulatory schemes, also noting that
technology alone was no substitute for enshrining FIPPs in law.23
Over the next fifteen years, the two sides in the debate have largely
held fast to their views, Congress has tried and failed to enact online
privacy legislation, and the FTC has fluctuated between supporting
legislation and giving self-regulation yet another try. What is most
striking about the ensuing privacy debate is neither the opposing
views of advocates and industry nor the FTC's ambivalence. Rather, it
is the assumption at the heart of the debate that policy makers must
choose exclusively between these two options. This is a false
dichotomy and one that neglects the wide variety of co-regulatory
alternatives that could be playing a larger role in the privacy arena.
In the mid-199os, industry and its supporters placed less value on
privacy than on market goals such as efficiency, flexibility, and
competitiveness. A number of economists and privacy scholars with a
free-market perspective developed the intellectual underpinnings of
this way of thinking by emphasizing three main points: (1) the social
and economic benefits that flow from "readily accessible information
about consumers" and the corresponding harm that would result from
privacy law to the extent that it interfered with such open information
21 Id. at 4.
22 See FED. TRADE COMM'N, STAFF REPORT: PUBLIC WORKSHOP ON CONSUMER PRIVACY ON
THE GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 27-29 (1996), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy/privacy.pdf.
23 Id.
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flows;24 (2) the extent to which a consent requirement regarding the
collection, use or transfer of personal information "burdens
consumers and creates costs";25 and (3) the belief that industry had
compelling market incentives for addressing customer privacy
concerns through self-regulatory measures.
Neoclassical economists such as Paul Rubin and Thomas Lenard
took this last point a step further by arguing that "market forces are
moving rapidly to provide the privacy desired by consumers, in part
by eliminating problems of asymmetric information."26 For support,
they pointed to numerous examples of adverse publicity forcing firms
accused of violating consumers' privacy expectations to modify their
data collection practices or to cancel their plans to combine or use
data in new ways.2 7 Rubin and Lenard also claimed that the Internet is
premised on the exchange of free content and services in return for
personal information used mainly for advertising and marketing
purposes and that there was little evidence that legal uses of
information for such purposes harm consumers. Accordingly, they
concluded that "the potential benefits of new privacy regulations are
very small."28
24 See Privacy in the Commercial World: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce,
Trade and Consumer Protection Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 17-26
(2001) (statement of Professor Fred H. Cate) (citing benefits such as the ready availability
and low cost of consumer credit, more convenient customer services, more relevant
advertising and marketing materials, and better fraud detection and prevention).
25 See Need for Internet Privacy Legislation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce,
Science and Transportation, 1o7th Cong. 18-28 (2001) (statement of Professor Fred H.
Cate) (arguing that consent requirements are costly because consumers tend to ignore
privacy notices, whatever their form, but that opt-out rules were preferable because they at
least preserved the flow of information). For a more detailed treatment, see FRED H. CATE,
PRIVACY IN PERSPECTIVE (2001). See also Swire, supra note 1 (describing additional costs
associated with privacy regulation such as (1) administrative costs on government and
taxpayers to draft, oversee, and enforce privacy rules; and (2) compliance costs on industry
due to the inevitable lack of precision and inflexibility of government rules).
26 PAUL H. RUBIN & THOMAS M. LENARD, PRIVACY AND THE COMMERCIAL USE OF PERSONAL
INFORMATION 49 (2001).
27 Id. at 51. More recently, Google responded to privacy concerns raised by its new Buzz
social network service by changing its feature within a week of launch. See David Coursey,
Google Apologizes for Buzz Privacy Issues, PC World (Feb. 15, 2010),
http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/189329/google-apologizesfor-buzz-pr
ivacyissues.html (last visited July 12, 2011).
28 RUBIN & LENARD, supra note 26, at 64. For contemporaneous studies by other
economists reaching similar conclusions, see Robert E. Litan, Balancing Costs and
Benefits of New Privacy Mandates 14-17 (AEI-Brookings, Working Paper No. 99-o3,
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On the other side of the debate, privacy scholars Jerry Kang and
Paul Schwartz sought to rebut these arguments by demonstrating the
existence of a privacy market failure, which they analyzed in terms of
two related ideas: information asymmetries and collective action
problems. In Kang's view, information asymmetries exist because
"individuals today are largely clueless about how personal information
is processed through cyberspace."29 Moreover, consumers face a
collective action problem because they find it difficult to band together
to bargain for better privacy practices due to their large numbers, lack
of repeat play, and difficulty in locating like-minded individuals.30
According to Schwartz, a third reason for skepticism about market-
based privacy standards is the "consent fallacy"-that is, the lack of
either informed or voluntary consumer consent to the privacy
practices of websites.3' Schwartz argues that the resulting market
failure awards a subsidy to companies that exploit personal data,
leading them to over-invest in collecting and tracking such data and to
under-invest in privacy protection. The only way to end this subsidy is
to establish a new default norm of minimal data disclosure-
something industry has no reason to pursue because it prefers "weak
standards that ratify the current status quo or even weaken it."32 In
1999), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract-id=179074; Robert W. Hahn & Anne
Layne Farrar, The Benefits and Costs of Online Privacy Legislation, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 85,
119-20 (2002). For an industry perspective, see Kent Walker, The Costs of Privacy, 25
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 87,87-88 (2001); J. Howard Beales, III & Timothy J. Muris,
Choice or Consequences: Protecting Privacy in Commercial Information, 75 U. CHI. L.
REV. 109 (2008) (emphasizing the value of information exchange and the need to base
privacy regulation not on FIPPs but on "the potential consequences for consumers of
information use and misuse").
29 Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1193,
1253 (1998).
30 Id. at 1254-56; see Swire, Markets, Self-Regulation, and Government Enforcement in
the Protection of Personal Information, supra note 1.
31 Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815, 833 (2000).
32 Id. at 847; see also Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND.
L. REV. 1609, 1686 (1999). In questioning the market's capacity to protect privacy, Kang
and Schwartz (like a great many other privacy scholars) also call attention to the invasive
nature of the Internet. Kang points out that "[t]he very technology that makes cyberspace
possible also makes detailed, cumulative, invisible observation of our selves possible." This
constant surveillance "leads to self-censorship" and undermines human dignity. Kang,
supra note 29, at 1198 & 1260. For Schwartz, the creation, combination, and sale of finely
granulated personal data that most people are unable to control results in what he calls the
"privacy horror show." Unlike Kang, his chief focus is the impact of excessive information
processing on democratic deliberation and an individual's capacity for self-rule. See
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short, Schwartz agrees with Kang that federal legislation is needed to
correct the market failure and overcome weak self-regulatory
standards.33
As scholars staked out opposing sides in the early years of this
debate, the FTC's position evolved from guarded enthusiasm for self-
regulation (which it described in 1999 as "the least intrusive and most
efficient means to ensure fair information practices, given the rapidly
evolving nature of the Internet and computer technology");34 to
growing doubt over whether self-regulatory initiatives were
succeeding;35 to formally recommending that Congress enact
comprehensive online privacy legislation.36 But, as of this writing,
Congress has yet to enact such legislation.
Schwartz, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, at 1621-32 & 1647-67. For an updated discussion of this
point, see DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 27-55 (2004).
33 See Schwartz, supra note 31, at 854-57 (applauding COPPA and supporting opt-in
requirements in privacy laws); Kang, supra note 29, at 1271-73 (arguing that both
advertising and other secondary uses of personal information should be permitted only
with statutorily-imposed opt-in consent).
34 FED. TRADE COMM'N, SELF-REGULATION AND PRIVACY ONLINE: REPORT TO CONGRESS 6
(1999), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/o7/privacy99.pdf (characterizing a view
stated in an earlier report); see also FED. TRADE COMM'N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO
CONGRESS (1998), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/toc.shtm [hereinafter
FTC, PRIVACY ONLINE REPORT].
35 These doubts arose after the FTC surveyed commercial websites' privacy practices and
found that only 14% of websites collecting personal information from consumers had
privacy notices and only 2% had a "comprehensive" privacy policy. Based on its analysis of
this data, the Commission concluded "the vast majority of online businesses have yet to
adopt even the most fundamental fair information practice (notice/awareness)." See FTC,
PRIVACY ONLINE REPORT, supra note 34, at 4. In Congressional testimony a few months
later, then-FTC Chairman Robert Pitofsky characterized industry's self-regulatory
initiatives as "inadequate and disappointing" and recommended that Congress enact online
privacy legislation unless industry demonstrated significant progress by the end of 1998.
See Electronic Commerce: Privacy in Cyberspace: Hearing on H.R. 2368 Before the
Subcomm. on Telecomms., Trade and Consumer Protection of the House Comm. on
Commerce, io5th Cong. (1998) (statement of Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, Fed. Trade
Comm'n), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/o7/privac98.htm.
36 In 2000, the FTC, by a 3-2 majority, recommended that Congress enact an omnibus
privacy law. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN
THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE: REPORT TO CONGRESS 36 (2000), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy2ooo/privacy20oo.pdf In part, this recommendation
hinged on the results of a second survey of website privacy practices that once again
demonstrated industry's failure to achieve broad adoption of self-regulatory initiatives.
Commissioner Orson Swindle dissented, stating that among the many deficiencies in the
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The next phase in the FTC's position occurred in 2001, when
President Bush appointed Tim Muris as FTC Chair and he shelved the
regulatory debate in favor of a new privacy agenda. This new agenda
was designed to protect consumers against the risk of economic
injuries (such as identity theft, phishing, and data breaches) and
threats of unwanted intrusions (such as online stalking,
telemarketing, and spam).37 Over the next eight years, Muris and his
successors at the FTC focused on reducing the harms associated with
information misuse and abuse, mainly through new programs (such as
the hugely popular "Do-Not-Call List"), more enforcement actions,
and consumer outreach. While the Commission continued to believe
in self-regulation as part of its broader agenda, it confined its work in
the privacy arena to problems causing specific harms and to laws that
enhanced its enforcement powers.38
A third phase emerged in 2006 when the FTC began to explore the
likely impact of technology and market changes on consumers and, for
the first time in many years, identified "self-regulatory initiatives" as
one of its primary objectives.39 Over the next two years, the
Commission renewed its earlier focus on the privacy issues associated
with online behavioral advertising (OBA) and embraced self-
regulatory guidelines for OBA as the best way forward.40
2ooo report, "there is absolutely no consideration of the costs and benefits of regulation."
Id. at 16 (dissenting Statement of Orson Swindle, FTC Commissioner).
37 See Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Remarks at the Privacy 2001
Conference (Oct. 4, 2001), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/privisploo2.shtm. In his remarks, Muris was quite
skeptical about the wisdom of enacting new online privacy legislation, questioning "how
such legislation would work and the costs and benefits it would generate."
38 See, e.g., CAN-SPAM Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699 (codified at 15
U.S.C. i 7701-7713 and 18 U.S.C. § 1037) (authorizing the FTC to enforce violations of the
Act); see also U.S. SAFE WEB Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109 -455, 120 Stat. 3372 (codified
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and at 12 U.S.C. § 3412) (enhancing the FTC's ability to
conduct investigations into illegal spam, spyware, and cross-border fraud and deception,
and to cooperate with its foreign counterparts).
39 FED. TRADE COMM'N, PROTECTING CONSUMERS IN THE NEXT TECH-ADE 4, 9, & 11 (2008),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2oo8/03/Po641o1tech.pdf (the other area was
protecting minors who use social networking websites). Although the agency published this
report in the spring of 20o8, it referred to a set of public hearings held in November 2006.
At these hearings, witnesses also mentioned self-regulatory efforts in the mobile device
industry and by developers of RFID devices.
40 See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM'N, ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING: MOVING THE
DISCUSSION FORWARD TO POSSIBLE SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES 3-6 (2007) available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2oo7/12/P8599oostmt.pdf; see also FED. TRADE COMM'N, STAFF
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And yet in 2009, no sooner did Jon Leibowitz become President
Obama's new FTC Chair, then he began to express doubts about the
efficacy of the self-regulatory approach. Noting that the current
behavioral advertising guidelines did not seem to be working, he
alluded to the recently issued Staff Guidelines on self-regulatory
principles for OBA and expressed hope that industry would respond
with concrete improvements. "Self-regulation, if it works, can be the
fastest and best way to change the status quo," he stated, at the same
time warning his audience, "If there isn't an appropriately vigorous
response, my sense is that Congress and the Commission may move
toward a more regulatory model."41
As Yogi Berra famously said, "This is dej& vu all over again." As
shown above, several earlier FTC Chairs arrived at exactly this point
only to reluctantly conclude that self-regulation would not work. One
may offer various explanations for Leibowitz's change in heart,
ranging from politics,42 to dissatisfaction with both the traditional
notice and choice model and the harms-based approach,43 to a
lingering concern over the unintended consequences that might result
from ill-conceived regulation of online advertising.44 An alternative
REPORT: SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING: TRACKING,
TARGETING, AND TECHNOLOGY (2009), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/02/Po854oobehavadreport.pdf [hereinafter Staff Report on
Self-Regulatory Principles]. In familiar words, this report characterized self-regulation as
providing "the necessary flexibility to address evolving online business models." Id. at 11.
41 JON LEIBOWITZ, CHAIRMAN, FED. TRADE COMM'N, REMARKS AT THE CENTER FOR
DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY GALA (Mar. 10, 2009), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/o9o31oremarksforedtdinner.pdf (last visited Mar.
9, 2011).
42 See Robert R. Belair, Presentation at the Harvard Symposium on Privacy and the ioth
and 111th Congresses, Congressional Privacy Policy Panel (Aug. 21, 2008), available at
http://www.ehcca.com/presentations/HIPAA16/belair-3.ppt (last visited Mar. 9, 2011)
(noting that privacy legislation has never enjoyed reliable political support, especially given
the relatively strong opposition from parts of industry and the jurisdictional complications
that inevitably arise when multiple committees lay claim to privacy initiatives).
43 See Stephanie Clifford, Fresh Views atAgency Overseeing Online Ads, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
5, 2009 at B5; see also An Interview With David Vladeck of the F.T.C. (Aug. 5, 2009),
http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/o8/05/an-interview-with-david-vladeck-
of-the-ftc/ (last visited July 12, 2011) [hereinafter Vladeck Interview] (citing statements by
David Vladeck, the new Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection, in which he
questions both the notice and consent framework and the harms-based framework).
44 See Robert E. Litan, Law and Policy in the Internet Age, 50 DUKE L.J. 1045, 1065 (2001)
(pointing out that statutory requirements may increase "the costs of marketing, leading to
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view pursued in this Article is that the best way to avoid the recurring
pattern of encouraging self-regulation and then doubting its
effectiveness as described above is to overcome the false dichotomy in
the privacy debate between self-regulation in the form of largely
voluntary industry codes and restrictive federal privacy legislation as
the sole alternatives. It should be clear from the above discussion that
there is an important role for regulation to play in the protection of
personal data, especially given the frequently disappointing results of
industry self-regulatory efforts. At the same time, it is equally clear
that the costs of prescriptive regulation are at present unknown, could
be very significant, and could have a deleterious effect on the success
of existing business models and/or the future growth of the
information technology sector. This suggests the importance of
finding new regulatory mechanisms that both do a good job of
protecting personal data, and do so in a cost-effective and flexible way.
The next section explores which forms of self-regulation (if any) could,
potentially, play this role.45
II. REGULATORY INNOVATION
Modern regulatory theory is founded on two basic propositions.
The first is that traditional forms of state regulation based on
detection and prosecution of violations of government-issued rules is
inadequate for a host of reasons: it is costly, inefficient, intrusive,
disregards the unique interests of individual firms in favor of a "one-
size-fits-all" approach, fails to harness industry expertise, and stifles
innovation.46 The second is that self-regulation has distinct
advantages over state regulation, including greater flexibility, lower
program costs, and higher compliance levels, which also enables
increased costs for products and possibly reduced choice . . . for consumers" if some sites
are forced to cut back on the availability of free online content and services).
45The need for new regulatory models is a recurring theme in the recent work of both U.S.
and European privacy officials. See Edward Wyatt & Tanzina Vega, Stage Set for
Showdown on Online Privacy, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2010, at Bi & B6 (noting that both the
FTC and the DOC will be issuing reports on online privacy before the end of 2010 and that
the EC recently issued a preliminary report describing needed changes in E.U. privacy
laws).
46 See Gunningham & Rees, supra note 6, at 364; Sinclair, supra note 6, at 530; IAN AYREs
& JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION
DEBATE 35-51 & io6 (Donald R. Harris et al. eds., 1992).
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regulators to focus more on "bad" actors. 47 At the same time, it is well
understood that self-regulation is unlikely to live up to its promise
unless there is some mechanism for constraining economic self-
interest. This implies a need for selective government involvement in
rulemaking (e.g., setting default requirements) and enforcement (e.g.,
requiring disclosure of performance and periodic assessment by the
state).48 And the weight of scholarly opinion suggests that such "co-
regulatory" solutions, which combine a self-regulatory mechanism
with some form of state intervention, "are more resilient and effective
than self-regulation in isolation."49 his Part begins by examining the
forms of self-regulation and their primary characteristics. Next, it
introduces the idea of regulatory covenants and gives an overview of
two kinds of environmental covenants that offer lessons for privacy
regulation-Project XL and regulatory negotiations. Finally, it
develops a normative framework for evaluating self-regulatory privacy
schemes. These normative insights also point the way towards a more
successful co-regulatory approach to protecting personal data.
A. TYPES OF SELF-REGULATION
Self-regulation defies easy definition, but at a minimum involves a
professional or private organization assuming responsibility for its
own rules and sanctions rather than being publicly regulated by
government. As noted earlier, it is a malleable term and may take
many different forms.5o One of the most common ways of
distinguishing different forms of self-regulation is to place them on a
continuum based on what role the government plays in regulatory
rulemaking and enforcement. Joseph Rees, for example, identifies
47 See Gunningham & Rees, supra note 6, at 366; AYRES & BRAJTHWAITE, supra note 46, at
103-lo6. See also Margot Priest, The Privatization of Regulation: Five Models of Self-
Regulation, 29 OTTAWA L. REv. 233, 268-71(1997-98) (noting that self-regulation is also
politically attractive because it allows a government "to reassure critics that an area is
being regulated ... while not having to take direct responsibility for the regulatory
regime").
48 See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 46, at 1o6 (arguing that firms participating in a
voluntary program will alter their behavior if doing so is cost-neutral or has only short-
term costs, but not if they must incur long-term costs); see also Priest, supra note 47, at
271-74; Gunningham & Rees, supra note 6, at 366 & 370.
49Gunningham & Rees, supra note 6, at 366.
50Se Sinclair, supra note 6, at 532; see also Gunningham & Rees, supra note 6, at 364.
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three main forms of self-regulation.51 One is voluntary self-regulation,
in which private firms carry out both tasks independent of direct
government involvement.52 The second and third are versions of what
Rees calls mandated self-regulation,53 which privatizes both
rulemaking and enforcement ("full" self-regulation) or limits
privatization to either one of the regulatory functions but not both
("partial" self-regulation). The mandatory aspect of these two forms
comes about through a legal requirement that firms self-regulate.54
Mandatory self-regulation therefore explicitly recognizes the
importance of the firm's internal compliance system in areas such as
occupational safety, where it is recognized that government lacks the
resources to inspect, monitor, and closely enforce safety in millions of
workplaces. Rather, it may be more effective for government to rely on
a firm's own safety system while creating incentives to ensure that
firms comply with relevant government standards.55
Margot Priest adopts a similar typology that distinguishes
different forms of self-regulation in terms of the degree of government
involvement, as well as several additional characteristics.56 She refers
to the form of self-regulation with the least government involvement
as voluntary codes of conduct, which are established by a group of
like-minded firms or by a trade association as a condition of
5' JOSEPH V. REES, REFORMING THE WORKPLACE: A STUDY OF SELF-REGULATION IN
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY 9-12 (1988).
52 The most prevalent form of privacy self-regulation in the U.S. is voluntary self-
regulation. Familiar examples include the Privacy Promise of the Direct Marketing
Association (DMA), the Individual Reference Service Group (IRSG) Principles (which
apply to data brokers), the Network Advertising Initiative (NAI) Principles (which apply to
online ad firms), the privacy seal programs of Truste and BBBOnline, the Online Privacy
Alliance (OPA) Guidelines, and various in-house programs of large multinationals such as
Microsoft and Google.
53 REES, supra note 51, at 10.
54 Id. at 11.
55 Rees's book explores a regulatory experiment carried out in the early 198os by the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) called the Cooperative
Compliance Program (CCP). This involved a three-way arrangement among unions,
management, and OSHA, in which the agency authorized labor-management safety
committees to assume many of OSHA's regulatory responsibilities at several large
construction sites while the agency ceased routine compliance inspections and pursued a
more cooperative relationship with the participating firms.
56 See Priest, supra note 47, at 240-41 (identifying ten characteristics).
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membership. The participating firms agree to operate according to
rules and procedures as defined by the code, which typically reflects
industry best practices. Like voluntary self-regulation as defined by
Rees, firms (or their trade associations) handle virtually all of the
regulatory functions ordinarily reserved for government. Thus,
participating firms are accountable to each other or the trade
association but not to government; they engage in rulemaking
consensually by members who adopt the code; there is neither
adjudication (except perhaps by a peer review committee) nor a
dispute resolution mechanism, and only limited sanctions apart from
dismissal by the trade association; and coverage of relevant industry
principles suffers from free rider problems due to the voluntary nature
of the regulatory regime. Finally, there is little public involvement,
although firms developing a code may engage in public consultation at
their discretion.57
At the opposite end of the scale, Priest refers to the form of self-
regulation with the highest degree of government involvement as
"regulatory self-management." She cites several examples of
regulatory self-management based on Canadian and U.S. health,
safety, and environmental programs in which the legislature "gives the
responsibility for the delivery of regulatory programs" to industry.s8
Although government remains responsible for rulemaking and
enforcement, it directs industry to implement a regulatory program
through "the application of rules and monitoring of compliance" by a
nonprofit self-management organization (SMO), which industry forms
to fulfill these responsibilities. Thus, in a regulatory self-management
scheme, the SMO remains accountable to government for its
performance and conduct; government engages in rulemaking, but
may consult with the SMO as to applicable industry or firm guidelines;
the SMO handles adjudication through a dispute resolution process
and imposes sanctions; and the approach avoids free rider problems
because all regulated entities must be part of an SMO. Finally, because
the government issues applicable rules, public involvement occurs as
part of the rulemaking process (i.e., via notice and comment) although
a SMO might also have a public representative as a member of its
Board.59
57 Id. at 242.
5 One of the three variants of regulatory self-management Priest identifies is mandatory
self-regulation. See REES, supra note 51.
59 Priest, supra note 47, at 251-62.
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What matters for present purposes is less the details of regulatory
self-management or the other intermediate forms of self-regulation
identified by Priest, and more their common characteristics and how
they contrast with voluntary codes. All of the former are co-regulatory
solutions in the sense that they involve a combination of direct
government regulation and private sector activity. Rees captures this
well when he describes mandatory self-regulation as "a governmental
strategy for strengthening private regulatory systems."6o
More generally, all forms of co-regulation have several common
characteristics. First, they tend to be cooperative rather than
adversarial, taking full advantage of corporate social responsibility as
a motivating factor in firm behavior.61 Second, co-regulatory models
rely on firms or intermediaries (such as trade associations,
independent auditors, and other third parties) to perform a variety of
government functions.62 Third, co-regulatory guidelines are less
prescriptive than state regulations (which tend to define required
actions) and more open-ended (stating broad intentions or a desired
outcome), thereby allowing regulated firms more discretion in
developing specific implementation plans.63 Fourth, firms tend to be
more committed to rules that they had a hand in shaping, resulting in
increased compliance rates. 64 Finally, co-regulation shifts the role of
government from one of rulemaking and imposing sanctions when
industry violates these rules, to that of providing incentives for
implementing self-regulatory programs while maintaining "a credible
residual program" of oversight and enforcement. 65 What distinguishes
these co-regulatory strategies from voluntary codes is not only the
degree of government involvement but, as noted above, differences in
accountability, rulemaking, adjudication, sanctions, and public
involvement.
So REES, supra note 51, at 1o (further noting that the purpose of mandatory self-regulation
"is to build into the social structure of the regulated enterprise a sustained and effective
commitment to insecure or precarious values-such as environmental protection,
affirmative action, [or] occupational safety").
61See Douglas C. Michael, Cooperative Implementation of Federal Regulations, 13 YALE J.
ON REG. 535,541-42 (1996).
62See Priest, supra note 47, at 238.
63 See Michael, supra note 61, at 544.
64 See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 46, at 113.
65 Michael, supra note 61, at 541.
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B. REGULATORY COVENANTS
In a path-breaking article published in 2oo6, Dennis Hirsch
discusses the possibilities of developing a new model for privacy
regulation based on a number of innovative environmental policy
tools that have emerged over the past thirty years. Hirsch begins by
contrasting the older, command-and-control model of environmental
regulation (in which regulators both command the level of required
performance and control the means of achieving it) with "second
generation" regulations that encourage "the regulated parties
themselves to choose the means by which they will achieve
environmental performance goals" resulting in "more cost-effective
and adaptable" strategies. 66 The defining characteristic of second-
generation strategies is that they "allow these self-directed actions to
count towards regulatory compliance." This radical departure from a
command-and-control regime spurs regulatory innovation by
harnessing a firm's own ingenuity in devising environmental solutions
that meet or exceed legal requirements yet fit a firm's business model
and the needs of its customers.67
Hirsch contends that privacy regulation has much to learn from
these second-generation environmental strategies and he proposes
several ideas for adapting them to protect information privacy without
deterring innovation. His most relevant idea for present purposes is a
form of co-regulation known as environmental covenants. In general,
environmental covenants are contractual agreements between
regulators and regulated firms. These negotiations may take place in
either of two contexts: (1) where government already regulates the
relevant area, or (2) where government is threatening to regulate an
area but has not yet done so. Other stakeholders, such as
environmental advocacy groups or members of the public, frequently
have a seat at the bargaining table. In both cases, the goal is to achieve
66See Dennis D. Hirsch, Protecting the Inner Environment: What Privacy Regulation Can
Learn from Environmental Law, 41 GA. L. REv. 1, 8 (2006). For a comprehensive analysis
of second-generation environmental strategies, see generally Richard B. Stewart, A New
Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REv. 21,38-151(2o1): see also
DANIEL J. FIORINO, THE NEW ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 19-21 (2oo6).
67On the other hand, enforcement becomes more challenging when firms choose how and
when to achieve regulatory goals as opposed to following a uniform national standard.
Thus, these innovative strategies work best when there are reliable monitoring
technologies available to measure actual pollution releases and less well when such
technologies are not as well developed. See Hirsch, supra note 66, at 37-40; see also
FIOINO, supra note 66, at 139.
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greater flexibility and responsiveness to specific conditions and more
rapid improvements than would otherwise occur under prescriptive
government regulation (threatened or existing). Industry finds these
covenants attractive because they have more input into the final
agreement than with conventional rulemaking efforts; the covenants
take the form of performance goals rather than technology mandates;
and their longer time frame better fits the normal business planning
and investment cycle, while government and society benefit from this
approach by achieving better results (such as steeper pollution
reductions) than might otherwise be politically achievable. 68 In the
U.S., environmental covenants take two distinct forms depending on
whether agreements are specific to an individual firm (Project XL) or
result from negotiation with an industry sector (negotiated
rulemaking).
Before considering these two distinct forms of covenants below, it
is worth pausing to ask why the covenanting approach potentially
achieves better solutions to environmental problems than command-
and-control regulations. Stewart offers an explanation based on the
logic of Coasian bargaining principles:
The premise is that legal rules will advance society's
welfare if they are voluntarily agreed to by all relevant
interests. If those with a stake in the regulatory
requirements-the regulated, the regulator, and
perhaps third party environmental or citizen interests-
agree on an alternative to the standard requirements,
the agreement may be presumed to be superior to the
standard. 69
68 See Stewart, supra note 66, at 60-94 (discussing examples of environmental agreements
at both the industry and firm level).
69 Stewart, supra note 66, at 61. On Coasian bargaining, see R.H. Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 6-8 (1960) (arguing that in the absence of transaction costs,
mutually beneficial agreements lead to an efficient outcome regardless of any initial
assignment of entitlements). As Stewart further explains:
[E]ach party to an environmental agreement will seek to maximize its
share of the gains produced by the negotiated departure from standard
requirements. A regulated firm or industry will seek to use the
flexibility afforded by environmental agreements to reduce compliance
costs and other burdens by using alternative or innovafive means that
would be precluded by the default requirements, gaining flexibility as to
2O11] 373
I/S: A JOURNAL OF IAW AND POLICY
Similarly, other scholars explain the success of the covenanting
approach in terms of the very nature of the underlying process, which
emphasizes "stakeholder representation, face-to-face negotiation,
[and] consensus-based decision making."7o What both explanations
have in common is a focus on information sharing, direct
negotiations, self-interested mutual compromises, and voluntary
agreement.
1. PROJECT XL
Project XL is a program authorizing the EPA to negotiate site-
specific covenants with individual firms under which the agency
would modify or relax existing regulatory requirements in exchange
for enforceable commitments to achieve improved environmental
results.7' Interested firms submit initial project proposals to the EPA
that satisfy very general criteria such as superior performance, cost
savings, stakeholder support, innovation, transferability (to other
facilities and possibly for future use in rules of national scope), and
feasibility. Once the EPA approves a proposal, the applicant works
with federal and state regulators on a Final Project Agreement (FPA)
defining the specific steps the company will take to improve
performance, the regulatory relief that will be granted, how
performance will be measured, and the expected environmental
the timing of compliance investments, and reducing regulatory
uncertainty .... For their part, the regulators and environmental and
citizen group third parties will seek a higher level of environmental or
other benefits than would have been obtained, as a practical matter,
under the standard default requirements. Regulators may also seek to
reserve the authority unilaterally to impose new requirements if new
environmental problems arise or the agreement for other reasons later
proves environmentally inadequate . . . . It will also be necessary to
structure the negotiation and representation process so as to minimize
the transaction and bargaining costs that could prevent successful
negotiation.
Id. at 61-62.
70See Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy
Benefit, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 6o, 71 & 132-35 (2000).
71See generally, Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects: Solicitation of proposals and
request for comment, 6o Fed. Reg. 27,282 (May 23, 1995) [hereinafter Notice of
Solicitation].
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results. The EPA allows stakeholders an opportunity to comment on a
draft FPA before finalizing the agreement. 72 For participating
businesses, Project XL offers major benefits, including regulatory
flexibility, reduced compliance costs, and greater regulatory certainty
during the life of the agreement. 73 Although the EPA hoped to begin
fifty pilot projects within two years of announcing Project XL,74 it did
not achieve this ambitious goal until a few years later.75
Despite having met agency goals, Project XL enjoys a mixed
reputation. Critics point to three serious flaws in its design and
implementation. First, they question the EPA's decision to refrain
from establishing a "baseline" for determining superior performance,
which has in turn led to overreaching by firms in requesting
regulatory exemptions unrelated to the purported "improvements" as
described in their XL project proposals.76 Second, the EPA offered
very little guidance as to what meaningful stakeholder participation
required. Was it a variety of interested parties reaching a broad
consensus that a proposed FPA protected the public interest or merely
industry and government officials consulting with the local
community? Moreover, national environmental groups complained
that while they lacked the financial resources to participate in FPA
negotiations, local community groups (whose participation the EPA
favored) lacked the necessary expertise to understand the highly
72 See id.
73 See Rena I. Steinzor, Regulatory Reinvention and Project XL: Does the Emperor Have
Any Clothes?, 26 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,527, 10,529-30 (1996).
74 See Notice of Solicitation, supra note 71, at 27,287.
75 See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PROJECT XL: DIRECTORY OF PROJECT ExPERIMENTS AND
RESULTS 2, available at http://www.epa.gov/projectxl/compoovol2/vol2_web.pdf. As of
November 2000, forty-eight firms had signed FPAs and the EPA had identified seventy
"innovations" within these projects. For a current listing of projects, see Envtl. Protection
Agency, XL Projects, http://www.epa.gov/projectxl/projects.htm (last visited Mar. 9,
2011).
76 See Steinzor, supra note 73 at 10,529-30; see also Dennis D. Hirsch, Project XL and the
Special Case: The EPA's Untold Success Story, 26 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 219, 249-51 (2001)
[hereinafter Success Story]; FIORINO, supra note 66, at 141. The EPA sought to address this
problem by modifying its original guidance on Project XL. See Regulatory Reinvention
(XL) Pilot Projects: Notice of Modifications to Project XL, 62 Fed. Reg. 19,872, 19,876
(Apr. 23, 1997) [hereinafter Notice of Modifications] (requiring that sponsors articulate the
link between the flexibility sought and the superior environmental performance. The EPA
also established a two-tier process for assessing such performance using both quantitative
and qualitative benchmarks).
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technical issues discussed in many XL proposals.'7 Finally, there are
severe doubts as to whether the EPA had enough legal authority to
approve FPAs that embodied different legal requirements from those
imposed by otherwise applicable statutes and regulations.?8
An obvious way to remedy Project XL's shortcoming would be for
Congress to enact new legislation defining the environmental
improvements required in every "experimental" XL project, clarifying
the process for stakeholder involvement, and granting the EPA
explicit authority to approve agreements that violate applicable
regulatory or statutory requirements.79 According to Hirsch, the
experimental dimension of Project XL is valuable because it allows the
EPA "to test out new and potentially better regulatory approaches and
environmental technologies."8o With this goal in mind, he proposes
three design changes. First, rather than just encouraging industry
proposals, the EPA should take the lead in identifying the innovative
approaches worth testing. Second, the EPA should pursue projects
consistent with its list of proposed innovations and enter into a small
number of agreements for carrying out discrete regulatory
experiments at a limited number of facilities, with no intention of
expanding these innovations on a national basis. Finally, these
"Experimental XL" projects should be rigorously evaluated by the EPA
in partnership with the same diverse group of stakeholders whose
ideas contributed to EPA's initial list of innovations worth testing.
Those projects that survive such rigorous scrutiny might later become
the basis for rulemaking or even new legislation, thereby preserving
ideas that truly demonstrate superior environmental performance.l
We will revisit Hirsch's proposal below in the discussion of innovative
forms of privacy self-regulation.82
77 See Steinzor, supra note 73, at 10,532-33; Hirsch, Success Story, supra note 76, at 251-
52; FIORINO, supra note 66, at 141-42. The EPA also sought to address this problem by
clarifying what it meant by "stakeholder involvement" and providing up to $25,000 per
project to assure that necessary technical assistance was available to support meaningful
participation. See Notice of Modifications, supra note 76, at 19,877-81.
78 See Steinzor, supra note 73, at 10,535-36; Hirsch, Success Story, supra note 76, at 244-
46; FIORINO, supra note 66, at 142.
79 See Hirsch, supra note 76, at 225-29.
8oId. at 255.
8i Id.
82 See infra Part I.A.
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2. NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING
Negotiated rulemaking (also referred to as regulatory negotiation
or "reg. neg.") is a statutorily-defined process by which agencies
formally negotiate rules with regulated industry and other
stakeholders as an alternative to conventional notice-and-comment
rulemaking. 83 The core insight underlying negotiated rulemaking is
that conventional rulemaking discourages direct communication
among the parties, often leading to misunderstanding and costly
litigation over final rules. In contrast, negotiated rulemaking brings
together agency personnel and representatives of the affected
interested groups to negotiate the text of a proposed rule based on
(more honestly presented) shared information and willingness to
compromise. If the negotiations succeed by achieving a consensus on
a proposed rule, the resulting final rule should be of better quality,
easier to implement, enjoy greater legitimacy, and lead to fewer legal
challenges.84
The Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990 (NRA) establishes a
statutory framework for negotiated rulemaking under which agencies
have the discretion to bring together representatives of the affected
parties in a negotiating committee (for example, industry,
environmental and consumer groups, and state and local
governments) for face-to-face discussions. If the committee reaches a
consensus,8 5 the agency can then issue the agreement as a proposed
rule subject to normal administrative review processes. Proposed
rules emerging from a negotiated rulemaking process are also subject
to judicial review.86 While the NRA augments Administrative
83 Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of 1946 (5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq.),
conventional rulemaking generally requires publication of the proposed rule in the Federal
Register, an opportunity for interested persons to comment on the proposed rule, and
publication of a final rule at least 30 days prior to its effective date. See 5 U.S.C. § 553.
84See Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990 (NRA), Pub. L. No. 101-648, § 2(3)-(5), 104
Stat. 4,969 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §H 561-570); see also ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING FACT SHEET, available at
www.epa.gov/adr/factsheetregneg.pdf; Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure
for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1 (1982) (discussing negotiation as a means of breaking deadlocks
produced by the conventional rulemaking process).
85 See 5 U.S.C. § 562(2) (defining "consensus" as "unanimous concurrence among the
interests represented" unless the committee agrees on a different definition such as general
concurrence).
86See 5 U.S.C. § 563(a)(7) & 570.
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Procedure Act (APA) rulemaking, it does not replace it. Indeed, most
of the language of the Act is permissive.7 If negotiations fail to reach a
consensus, the agency may proceed with its own rule.
The promise of negotiated rulemaking is that by enlisting diverse
stakeholders in the rulemaking process, responding to their concerns,
and reaching informed compromises, better quality rules will emerge
at a lower cost and with greater legitimacy.88 Critics counter that the
process not only fails to deliver its purported benefits (and then only
rarely) but that its very use undermines the foundations of
administrative law by shifting the decision-making function from
agencies tasked with protecting the public interest to a collection of
interest groups with their own private agendas.9 In 2000, Jody
Freeman and Laura Langbein published a comprehensive analysis and
summary of an empirical study of negotiated rulemaking.90 The study
compared participant attitudes toward negotiated versus conventional
rulemaking. Based on their analysis, they concluded that "reg. neg.
generates more learning, better quality rules, and higher satisfaction
than conventional rulemaking" as well as increasing legitimacy, which
they defined as "the acceptability of the regulation to those involved in
its development."91 But even if this very positive analysis is taken at
face value, Lubbers shows that the EPA use of negotiated rulemaking
is in fact quite limited, having fallen off in recent years by almost two-
thirds.92 Despite this decline, which Lubbers attributes to budgetary
issues and the burdens of complying with federal advisory committee
87 See Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Achieving Policymaking Consensus: The (Unfortunate) Waning
ofNegotiated Rulemaking, 49 S. Tex. L. Rev. 987, 989 (2oo8) (noting that "the Act does
not require the agency to publish either a proposed or final rule merely because a
negotiating committee proposed it").
88 See Harter, supra note 84.
89 For a discussion of the main lines of criticism, see Lubbers, supra note 87, at 1003-04.
90 See Freeman & Langbein, supra note 70, at 132-35 (presenting analysis and a summary
of empirical evidence from Neil Kerwin and Laura Langbein's two-phase study of EPA
negotiated rulemakings). I want to thank Peter Schuck for referring me to this article and
alerting me to the relevance of the reg. neg. debate.
91 Id. at 63.
92 See Lubbers, supra note 87, at 996. Although agencies have discretion under the NRA to
determine whether to rely on negotiated rulemaking provided they consider the seven
factors identified in 5 U.S.C. § 563(a), Congress has mandated its use in several statutes
across a range of issues. For a list of congressionally-mandated reg. neg. procedures, see
Lubbers, id. at 1007-15.
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requirements, Lubbers insists upon the proven value of reg. neg. in
providing creative solutions to regulatory problems.93
Other environmental law scholars have identified a few situations
where negotiated rulemaking should provide the EPA with significant
advantages. For example, Andrew Morriss and his colleagues point to
situations "where the substance of the regulation requires the credible
transmission of information between the regulated entities and other
interest groups, and where the agency's preference for a particular
substantive outcome is weak."94 Reg. neg. also requires "a relatively
high degree of shared interest among the groups participating, the
existence of gains from trade to allow parties to compromise, and a
willingness by interest groups to reject the role of spoiler."95 These
views are largely consistent with the findings of Daniel Selmi, who
conducted a detailed study of the negotiation of a regional air quality
rule. Selmi explained that the parties were willing to compromise for
several reasons: (i) the industry believed that regulation was
inevitable; (2) the environmental groups recognized that even though
they preferred an outcome based on new and expensive technology,
they lacked the political capital to achieve this result; and (3) the
agency was not locked into a rigid, initial position, but remained open
towards finding a solution that responded to information acquired
during the negotiations. But the key factor in reaching a compromise
was a very practical one-namely, that the facilitator had the
necessary skills to assist the parties in identifying their priorities and
to help them make tradeoffs in which they each achieved some of their
goals.96
In sum, both Project XL and negotiated rulemaking have strengths
and weaknesses. Key strengths of a well-designed covenanting
approach include innovation (because covenants invite firms to tap
93 Id. at loo6 (giving the example of a recent reg. neg. involving a regional air quality rule).
94 Andrew P. Morriss et al., Choosing How to Regulate, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 179, 183
(2005).
95 Id.
96 See Daniel P. Selmi, The Promise and Limits ofNegotiated Rulemaking: Evaluating the
Negotiation of a Regional Air Quality Rule, 35 ENVTL. L. 415, 435-38 (2005). Scholars
disagree over a much more general issue regarding the suitability of reg. neg. in any given
situation. Selmi notes that some scholars "argue that controversial rules make good
candidates for negotiation, while others contend the process is best utilized for narrow
questions of implementation. A third group stresses that agencies should use negotiation to
tackle situafions where the policy implications are limited." (citations omitted). Id. at 467-
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into their own ingenuity); flexibility (in the form of tailored rules that
either match the circumstances of an individual firm, as in Project XL,
or the underlying conditions faced by a regulated industry based on
superior expertise, as in negotiated rulemaking); greater commitment
(because companies write or at least negotiate their own rules rather
than having them imposed externally); more effective compliance
(because internal discipline as practiced by firms that agree to rules of
their own devising is likely to be more extensive and cheaper for
everyone than government investigations and prosecutions); and, as a
result of these benefits, lower-cost solutions. On the other hand,
covenants have a number of obvious weaknesses, including higher
administrative burdens associated with negotiating the rules
(although this might be mitigated by lower overall costs for
compliance and litigation); legal uncertainty in the case of Project XL;
and a bias against small firms, which typically lack the resources
necessary to negotiate facility-based standards or to participate in a
negotiating committee.97
C. NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING SELF-REGULATORY
INITIATIVES
Having identified different types of self-regulation and their co-
regulatory characteristics, and having investigated environmental
covenants such as Project XL and regulatory negotiations (in keeping
with Hirsch's suggestion that such covenants may provide the basis
for innovative approaches to privacy regulation), this Article now
presents a normative framework for evaluating the effectiveness of co-
regulatory programs. Part III will apply this normative framework to
four instances in which regulators have used co-regulation in the field
of information privacy and assess their relative merits. The normative
framework developed here melds the discussion of standard public
policy criteria in Part JI.A with the central features of second-
generation strategies as reflected in the analysis of covenants in Part
II.B. The resulting framework consists of six elements that are critical
to the success of co-regulatory initiatives: efficiency, openness and
transparency, completeness, strategies to address free rider
problems, oversight and enforcement, and use of second-generation
design features.
97 For a similar list of the strengths and weaknesses of enforced self-regulation, see AYRES &
BRALTHWAITE, supra note 46, at 1n0-i6 & 120 28.
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1. EFFICIENCY
Efficiency may be defined as "achieving regulatory objectives at
the lowest attainable cost."98 For all forms of self-regulation,
efficiencies arise from harnessing industry expertise in the
development of industry codes, which are inherently more flexible
than legislation and may be tailored to the circumstances of individual
firms, or adjusted to changes in market conditions or new
technologies. In general, self-regulation costs less for government
than regulatory rulemaking and enforcement because it shifts costs to
industry. Whether it costs less for industry depends on the form of
self-regulation and whether industry passes on its costs to
consumers. 99
2. OPENNESS AND TRANSPARENCY
Openness refers to whether the self-regulatory system allows the
public to play any role in developing the underlying rules and
enforcement mechanisms. Transparency, on the other hand, is a
function of a system's ability "to produce and promulgate two kinds of
information: (1) information about the normative standards the
industry has set for itself; and (2) information about the performance
of member companies in terms of those standards."1oo In general, self-
regulatory schemes publicize the existence and content of their
principles (especially if their rules are determined by statute and
hence publicly available). Purely voluntary codes may involve public
interest groups at the discretion of member firms. When firms decide
to develop codes using a consensus-based process, however, a wider
range of interests is likely to be represented. Finally, performance
data is not usually shared with the public and most self-regulatory
organizations treat enforcement proceedings as private, but may
publicly announce the outcome of any enforcement actions involving
member firms.
98 See Priest, supra note 47, at 274.
99 This analysis of efficiency ignores privacy externalities, which may arise when firms fail
to consider the consequences to consumers of violating their privacy. See Hal R. Varian,
Economic Aspects of Personal Privacy, in PRIVACY AND SELF-REGULATION IN THE
INFORMATION AGE (U. S. Dep't of Commerce ed., 1997), available at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/privacy/selfregi.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2011).
00 See Gunningham & Rees, supra note 6, at 383.
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3. COMPLETENESS
Completeness is the straightforward matter of whether a self-
regulatory code of conduct addresses all relevant aspects of the
standards governing industry practices. In privacy terms, these
standards are embodied in the FIPPs, which are the benchmark
against which the FTC and privacy advocates evaluate any self-
regulatory privacy scheme.lol Unless they adhere to a pre-existing
industry standard, voluntary codes often omit principles or practices
that their members find too burdensome. In contrast, where
government establishes default requirements on a statutory basis,
incompleteness is rarely an issue.
4. STRATEGIES TO ADDRESS FREE RIDER PROBLEMS
Free riding occurs in voluntary programs when members enjoy the
benefits of a program without having to meet its obligations. As
Fiorino notes, "It reduces confidence in the reliability and quality of
participants and thus affects the program's credibility."102 There are
two main versions of the free rider problem. First, some firms may
agree to join a program but merely feign compliance. And second,
certain firms in the relevant sector may simply refuse to join at all.
Both versions are potentially fatal to self-regulatory programs because
they create a competitive disadvantage for honest participants. The
first version may be counteracted by "peer group pressure, shaming,
or more formal sanctions" while the second may require that
"government intervenes directly to curb the activities of non-
participants."103 Obviously, free rider problems dissipate when
regulated entities are required to participate in a self-regulatory
program or when codes of conduct are subject to government review
and approval. Self-regulatory initiatives need to incorporate such
strategies in order to prove effective.
5. OVERSIGHT AND ENFORCEMENT
At an early stage of the U.S. government's support for self-
regulatory privacy guidelines, the DOC commissioned a study of the
101 See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
102 FIORINO, supra note 66, at 125.
103 Gunningham & Rees, supra note 6, at 393-94.
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criteria for effective self-regulation. In addition to substantive criteria
based on FIPPs, the DOC study identified three oversight and
enforcement criteria: (1) consumer recourse, or the availability of
affordable mechanisms for resolving complaints and perhaps
awarding some compensation to an injured party; (2) verification, or
the nature and extent of audits or more cost-effective ways to verify
that a companies' assertions about its privacy practices are true and to
monitor compliance with a program's requirements; and (3)
consequences for failure to comply with program requirements, such
as cancellation of the right to use a seal, public notice of a company's
non-compliance, or suspension or expulsion from the program.10 4
Voluntary codes are often deficient in all three components. Once
again, required government approval of these oversight and
enforcement mechanisms ensures that baseline regulatory objectives
are met.
6. USE OF SECOND-GENERATION DESIGN FEATURES
The central features of second-generation environmental
strategies are discussed at considerable length by Stewart and
Fiorino.o5 For present purposes, their insights may be boiled down
(however inadequately) to the following catch phrase: self-interested
mutual promises that reward good actors for superior performance.
These strategies presuppose direct bargaining, information sharing,
and the affected parties buying-in to cost-effective and innovative
regulatory solutions. In view of these characteristics, second-
generation strategies such as environmental (or privacy) covenants
should achieve better outcomes than either conventional rulemaking
or voluntary self-regulation.
III. FOUR CASE STUDIES
This Article now presents four case studies of self-regulatory
privacy schemes. The first case study focuses on the Network
Advertising Initiative (NAI) Principles, a voluntary code established
by an ad hoc industry advertising group that also oversees members'
compliance. The second case study looks at a safe harbor solution for
104 See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE & OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ELEMENTS OF EFFECTIVE
SELF-REGULATION FOR THE PROTECTION OF PRIvACY (1998), available at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/privacydraft/198dftprin.htm.
105 See supra note 66.
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U.S. firms needing to transfer data from the E.U. to the U.S. without
running afoul of E.U. data protection requirements. To benefit from
the safe harbor, firms have to certify that they will comply with
privacy principles negotiated between the U.S. and E.U. but
administered by industry seal programs. The third case study deals
with FTC-approved safe harbor programs under COPPA, focusing, in
particular, on that of the Children's Advertising Review Unit (CARU).
Each of these three self-regulatory schemes will be classified using
Priest's typology and evaluated in terms of the six factors identified
above in Part II.C. The fourth and final case study begins with a brief
overview of privacy covenants, both in the U.S. and abroad, and then
turns to a very recent example of a voluntary covenanting approach to
privacy. This last case study is less a detailed description and analysis
of a specific program, and more a transitional step towards second-
generation strategies.
A. THE NETWORK ADVERTISING INITIATIVE
On November 8, 1999, the DOC and the FTC held a public
workshop on online profiling, which the FTC defined as the collection
of data about consumers using cookies and web bugs to track their
activities across the web.106 Although much of this information is
anonymous in the narrow sense of not including a user's name,
profiling data may include both personally identifiable information
(PII) and non-personally identifiable information (non-PII).1o7 This
data may also be "combined with 'demographic' and 'psychographic'
data from third-party sources, data on the consumer's offline
purchases, or information collected directly from consumers through
surveys and registration forms."os The resulting profiles often are
1o6 See FED. TRADE COMM'N, ONLINE PROFILING: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 1-3 (2000),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2oo/o6/onlineprofilingreportjune2OOO.pdf
[hereinafter ONLINE PROFILING: A REPORT TO CONGRESS].
107 Id. at 3-4. PII is data that can be linked to specific individuals such as name, address,
phone number, e-mail address, social security number, and driver's license number. Non-
PII consists mainly in page views, search query terms, purchases, and click-through
responses to ads. Although network advertisers link the profiles that result from tracking
such consumer activity to a unique identifier, they generally do not know the name of a
specific consumer. Hence, profiles are considered "anonymous." But see STAFF REPORT ON
SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES, supra note 40, at 21-22 (rejecting this distinction because
"the traditional notion of what constitutes PII versus non-PII is becoming less and less
meaningful and should not, by itself, determine the protections provided for consumer
data").
108 Id. at5.
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highly detailed and revealing yet remain largely invisible to
consumers, many of whom react negatively when informed that their
online activities are monitored.109
The FTC recognized several benefits in the use of cookies and
other technologies to create targeted ads, such as providing
information about products and services in which consumers are
interested and reducing the number of unwanted ads. More
importantly, targeted ads increase advertising revenues, which
subsidize free online content and services.nlo On the other hand, the
FTC acknowledged several major privacy concerns raised by online
profiling such as the lack of consumer awareness; the scope of the
monitoring activities, which occurs across multiple websites for an
indefinite period of time; the potential for associating anonymous
profiles with particular individuals; and the risk of companies using
profiles to engage in price discrimination." Despite these concerns,
the Commission, in June 2000, encouraged the network advertising
industry to craft an industry-wide self-regulatory program.112
Eight firms responded by announcing the formation of the NA.
Their key tenets included notice to consumers of what information
network advertising firms collect and how that information is used,
the ability to opt out of receiving tailored ads, and consumer outreach
and education.113 Less than a year later, the NAI completed a
109 Id. at 14; see also Stephanie Clifford, Tracked for Ads? Many Americans Say No
Thanks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2009, at B3 (discussing new survey of consumer attitudes to
online tracking by advertisers).
no See ONLINE PROFILING: A REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note io6, at 1o; see also David S.
Evans, The Online Advertising Industry: Economics, Evolution, and Privacy, 23 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 37 (2009) (noting that although online advertising benefits consumers by
increasing the likelihood of their receiving relevant ads and by reducing the costs of
advertising to businesses, which may result in lower consumer prices, it also creates a
privacy dilemma).
"l Id. at 10-14.
112 Id. at 1.
113 See Daniel Jaye et al., Testimony at the Dep't of Commerce & Fed. Trade Comm'n Public
Workshop on Online Profiling: The Role of Self-Regulation (Nov. 8, 1999), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/profiling/comments/nai.htm. By the time this
workshop took place, the eight NAI firms faced a highly credible threat of regulatory
intervention. Privacy complaints about the use of cookies for advertising purposes were
growing and only intensified when DoubleClick announced plans to combine the profiling
data it collected online with offline data obtained from a merger with a leading data
marketing firm, Abacus. This led to investigations by the FTC and several state Attorneys
Generals, a class action consumer lawsuit, Congressional hearings on online profiling, and
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voluntary code of conduct that won the FTC's praise and informal
endorsement.114 Under the original NAI Principles, network
advertisers engaging in online preference marketing (OPM) are
required to offer consumers notice and choice, both of which vary
depending on whether the data collected is non-PII or a combination
of P11 and non-PII.' The use of non-PI requires member firms to
post on their websites "clear and conspicuous" notice of profiling
activities, including what type of data is collected and how it is used;
procedures for opting out of such uses; and the retention period for
such data.116 The opportunity to opt-out must be accessible on the
firm's or the NAI's website. Moreover, NAI firms that enter into a
contract with a publisher for OPM services must require that they
offer similar privacy protections to consumers."7 The merger of P11
and non-PII for OPM purposes are subject to substantially similar
notice requirements, but the choice options are more complex.
Network advertisers merging P11 with previously collected non-PII
must first obtain a consumer's affirmative (opt-in) consent, whereas
mergers of P11 and non-PII collected on a going forward basis must
afford consumers "robust notice" and an opt-out choice; the latter rule
also applies to using PI collected offline when merged with PII
collected online." 8 Enforcement is another requirement that applies to
massively bad publicity. See Evan Hansen, Double-click Postpones Data Merging Plan,
CNet (Mar. 2, 2000), http://news.cnet.com/DoubleClick-postpones-data-merging-
plan/2100-1023_3-237532.html?tag=mnco (last visited July 12, 2011).
114 See FED. TRADE COMM'N, ONLINE PROFILING: RECOMMENDATIONS 9 (July 2000),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/07/onlineprofiling.pdf (praising the NAI for
both the "innovative aspects of their proposal" and for adopting self-regulatory principles
that "address the privacy concerns consumers have about online profiling and are
consistent with fair information practices").
"s See FED. TRADE COMM'N, NETWORKADVERTISING INITIATIVE: SELF-REGULATORY
PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE PREFERENCE MARKETING BY NETWORK ADVERTISERS 4 (2000),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/07/NAI/207-10/2oFinal.pdf
n6 Id.
117 Id. at 5. Similar requirements (excluding the opportunity to opt out) apply to the
collection of data for ad delivery and reporting purposes. Id. at 6-7.
us Id. at 8. "Robust notice" is defined as "clear and conspicuous notice about the scope of
the non-PIT that would be made personally identifiable and how the non-PII will be used as
a result of such merger." Id. at 9. It is not obvious how robust notice differs from ordinary
notice, which also must be "clear and conspicuous."
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all NAI members,19 and the NAI offers several additional consumer
protections as well.120
For the next seven years, the NAI principles remained unchanged
until two highly publicized incidents sparked renewed concerns over
online profiling practices. The first incident involved a civil subpoena
to Google seeking search query records.121 The second involved
disclosure of millions of search queries by AOL.12 2 Both incidents
involved leading search firms, whose business models are premised on
providing free searches and a host of related services in exchange for
serving targeted ads to customers based on their search queries and
other data collected from users of these services. Over the next two
years, consumer privacy organizations began filing complaints
regarding online advertising practices and the proposed mergers
between industry giants such as Google and DoubleClick. Both E.U.
data protection agencies and the FTC started reviewing these
activities, while the industry responded to the regulatory pressure by
proposing new practices and technologies for improving search
119 The NAI Principles offer two options: (1) participation in a seal program that includes
"typical" elements such as random third-party audits, a complaint process, and sanctions
including revocation of the seal accompanied by public notice, or (2) independent audits of
a member's practices that would be made publicly available on the NAI's website. Id. at 12.
120 These include a prohibition on the use of "sensitive data" (defined as PII about
"sensitive medical or financial data, sexual behavior or sexual orientation, [and] social
security numbers") for OPM purposes; an opt-in requirement for using any previously
collected data (non-PII or PII) under a materially different privacy policy; a set of rather
limited pledges regarding security and access; and an agreement by NAI members to abide
by the principles of notice, choice, access and security as defined by the OPA Guidelines.
Id. at 3, 6.
12 The Dept. of Justice (DOJ) sought these records to assist the U.S. government in
proving the constitutionality of the Child Online Protection Act. See Verne Kopytoff,
Google Says No to Data Demand: Government Wants Records of Searches, S.F. CHRON.,
Jan. 20, 2006, at Al. A district court eventually approved a narrower DOJ request
requiring Google to turn over a random sample of 50,000 URLs for use in the DOJ study.
See Gonzalez v. Google, 234 F.R.D. 674 (N.D. Cal. 2oo6).
122 This occurred the following year, when AOL inadvertently disclosed about 20 million
search queries with random identifiers in lieu of user ID's, but the queries were sufficiently
revealing to allow reporters to identify an individual user by name. Press coverage of both
incidents suggest that consumers were very surprised to learn that Google retained search
records at all and could be forced to hand them over to the government, or that AOL would
voluntarily share such records with researchers. See Michael Barbaro & Tom Zeller Jr., A
Face is Exposed for AOL Searcher No. 4417749, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2006, atMA.
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privacy and addressing online profiling practices.123 Then, in 2007, the
FTC held a two-day workshop focused on behavioral targeting. In
connection with this workshop, the World Privacy Forum (WPF)
prepared a highly critical report attacking the effectiveness of the
NAI's self-regulatory scheme during the previous seven years.12 4 NAI
responded to these and other criticisms by releasing a draft update to
its original NAI Principles (this time soliciting public comments on
the proposed changes).125 The newly expanded organizationl2 6 then
published its revised code of conduct to mixed reviews.
Clearly, the NAI Principles constitute a voluntary code of conduct,
exhibiting virtually all of the relevant characteristics as described in
Part II.A. As such, do the original (or revised) NAI principles suffer
from the shortcomings associated with voluntary codes, or do they live
up to their promise of protecting consumer privacy? In other words,
how do the principles fare when assessed against the six elements of
the normative framework described in Part II.C?
To begin with, the principles are efficient for member firms, but
less so for government (given the ongoing costs of FTC oversight) and
for the public (given the negative externalities associated with
behavioral profiling).127 Second, when the original principles were
123 See Kevin J. O'Brien & Thomas Crampton, European Union Probes Google Over Data
Retention Policy, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2007, at C3.
124See PAM DIXON, THE NETWORK ADVERTISING INITIATIVE: FAILING AT CONSUMER
PROTECTION AND SELF-REGULATION 14-27, 28-30 & 32-38 (2007), available at
http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/pdf/WPF_NAIreportNov2-2007fs.pdf [hereinafter
WPF Study] (arguing that the NAI opt-out mechanism was a failure because it often didn't
work; consumers sometimes deleted the opt-out cookie inadvertently, and this technology
was ineffective against newer tracking technologies; that there was a severe and rapid
drop-off in NAI membership from twelve members in 2000 to just two members in 2003,
although this may have been due in part to the dot.com collapse; and raising doubts about
NAI's compliance program, which had been outsourced to Truste, for having a weak
consumer complaint mechanism and for neglecting random audits).
125 See Network Advertising Initiative, NAI Principles 2008: The Network Advertising
Initiative's Self-Regulatory Code of Conduct for Online Behavioral Advertising (2oo8),
available at
http://networkadvertising.org/networks/NAI_Principles_2Oo8-DraftforPublic.pdf.
126 See NETWORK ADVERTISING INITIATIVE, NAI'S SELF-REGULATORY CODE OF CONDUCT
(2008), available at
http://www.networkadvertising.org/networks/2008%2oNAI%2OPrinciples-final%2ofor%
2oWebsite.pdf (in the wake of renewed public scrutiny, the NAI grew to twenty-five
members).
127 See Evans, supra note 110, at 33 (noting the privacy externalities of overly lenient
regulation of online ads). As Evans states: "Consumers could incur the costs of having
388 [Vol. 6:3
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issued in 2000, privacy advocates complained about the NAI's lack of
transparency. Although the principles were posted online, the
preliminary discussions between the NAI firms and the FTC were far
less transparent-they took place largely behind closed doors.128
Third, the original principles were considered weak on notice, choice,
and access;12 9 and critics were not much happier with the retrograde
forms of notice, choice, and access permitted under the 2009 revised
Principles.13o Fourth, at least in the early years, network advertising
firms suffered from both versions of the free rider problem (feigned
compliance and non-participation) and the NAI program did not
include any mechanisms that capably addressed them.131 It remains to
private information disclosed and potentially misused, and incur the costs of reducing their
use of the web because of concerns over privacy. Regardless of whether their private
information is disclosed consumers may not like receiving ads that reflect too much
knowledge about them even if it is only a software program on a remote server that has
that knowledge."
128 See EPIC.org, Network Advertising Initiative: Principles Not Privacy,
http://epic.org/privacy/Internet/nai-analysis.html (noting that privacy and consumer
groups were all but excluded from the NA-FTC discussions with the exception of a single
meeting very late in the process). In revising the principles in 2oo9, however, NAI took a
very different approach. It not only published draft principles for public comment, but then
issued revised principles and simultaneously published a fifty-page summary of these
comments along with its own responses, which in many cases consisted in changing the
draft principles. See NETWORK ADVERTISING INITIATIVE, RESPONSE TO PUBLIC COMMENTS
RECEIVED ON THE 2oo8 NAI PRINCIPLES DRAFT (2oo8), available at
http://www.networkadvertising.org/networks/NAI%2oResponse%2Oto%20Public%20CO
mmentsFinal%2ofor%2oWebsite.pdf. Of course, NAI, not the government, still holds the
pen and makes final decisions on how to balance public comments against industry goals.
129 See WPF Study, supra note 124 passim.
130 Although the FTC applauded the 2oo9 revisions for extending the scope of the access
and security principles to data used not only for behavioral targeting, but also for practices
such as ad delivery and reporting on a single domain or across multiple domains site (so-
called "multi-site advertising"), the Commission also criticized NAI's failure to develop
more effective and innovative disclosure and choice options beyond the mere inclusion in
the text of a posted privacy policy. See STAFF REPORT ON SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES,
supra note 40, at 14.
131 As the WPF study observed, the FTC was unsuccessful in maintaining a serious threat of
government regulation, and NAI membership rapidly deteriorated once Muris announced
his new agenda and Congress failed to enact privacy legislation. Moreover, by creating a
category for "Associate Members" (who were not required to abide by the NAI Principles),
NAI institutionalized the problem of half-hearted participation. See WPF Study, supra note
124, at 28-31. This improved only after the FTC showed renewed interest in behavioral
advertising, and advocacy groups began filing complaints with the Commission objecting
both to the profiling practices of network advertising and search firms, and to proposed
mergers involving the leading players.
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be seen whether these issues will persist now that the FTC is again
encouraging self-regulation, although current policy may change
depending on whether or not Congress enacts new privacy legislation.
Fifth, the NAI program is also deficient with respect to all three
oversight and enforcement criteria identified in the DOC study
referred to above. In terms of consumer recourse, the NAI Principles
make formal provision for consumers to file complaints (which are
now handled in-house) but are silent on remedies.132 As to verification
and consequences for failure to comply, the NAI track record is
extremely poor both on auditing compliance and invoking remedies
(such as revocation, public suspension of membership, and referral to
the FTC). Indeed, it is not clear whether such actions have occurred
during its previous nine years of operation, although NAI's approach
to audits seems to be changing for the better.133 Finally, although the
more open process NAI used in revising its principles in 2009 is a
good first step towards using second-generation strategies, it is still
deficient in terms of direct negotiations, Coasian bargaining, and
mutual buy-in.
B. THE U.S.-E.U. SAFE HARBOR AGREEMENT
Article 25 of the European Union Data Protection Directive (E.U.
Directive) limits the transfer of personal data to a third country unless
it provides an "adequate" level of privacy protection.134 Unlike the E.U.
Directive, which is an omnibus statute protecting all personal
information of European citizens, U.S. privacy protection relies on a
combination of sectoral laws, FTC enforcement powers, and self-
regulation. As a result of these differences, U.S. firms were uncertain
about the legality of data flows from the E.U. to the U.S. under the
132 Given how little consumers understand about profiling practices, it seems unlikely that
they would be able to determine which NAI firm might be misusing their data or whether
any violation of the Principles has occurred.
'3 The NAI initially promised random audits by seal programs, but there is no data on
whether these ever occurred. Under the NAI's newly announced Compliance Program, NAI
staff conducted its first annual compliance reviews of member companies and posted a
summary of the results on the website. See NETWORK ADVERTISING INITIATIVE, 2009
ANNUAL COMPLIANCE REPORT (2009), available at
http://www.networkadvertising.org/pdfs/2oo9_NAComplianceReport_12-30-o9.pdf
(summarizing the annual review by NAI Staff of member companies' compliance with the
new NAI Principles).
'34 Council Directive 95/46, art. 25(1), 1995 0.J. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter Council Direcfive
95/46/EC].
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Article 25 adequacy standard. After several years of discussion, the
European Commission (EC) and the DOC entered into a Safe Harbor
Agreement (SHA) spelling out Privacy Principles that would apply to
U.S. companies and other organizations receiving personal data from
the E.U.135
The SHA creates a voluntary mechanism enabling U.S.
organizations to demonstrate their compliance with the E.U. Directive
for purposes of data transfers from the E.U. They must self-certify to
the DOC that they adhere to the Privacy Principles that mirror the
core requirements of the E.U. Directive (i.e., notice, choice, onward
transfer, security, data integrity, access, and enforcement), and repeat
this assertion in their posted privacy policy.136 Although the FTC has
agreed to treat any violation of the Privacy Principles as an unfair or
deceptive practice, the SHA also defines the mechanism that firms
should use to ensure compliance with these principles. These include:
(i) readily available and affordable independent recourse mechanisms
for investigating and resolving individual complaints and disputes;137
(2) verification procedures regarding the attestations and assertions
businesses make about their privacy practices, which may include self-
assessments (which must be signed by a corporate officer and made
available upon request) or outside compliance reviews;138 and (3)
remedies for failure to comply with the Privacy Principles, including
not only correction of any problems, but also various sanctions such as
publicizing violations, suspension, removal from a seal program, and
compensation for any harm caused by the violation.139 Truste,
135 On July 21, 2000, the DOC formally issued the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles and other
supplementary documents explaining how U.S. enforcement mechanisms would apply, and
addressing related issues of interpretation, with the understanding that the Commission
would then determine that this safe harbor framework provides adequate protection for
the purpose of data transfer to participating companies. See DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SAFE
HARBOR PRIVACY PRINCIPLES (2000), available at
http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/ecom/SHPRINCIPLESFINAL.htm.
136 Note that there are other ways of meeting the adequacy requirement, such as individual
consent, standard contractual clauses, binding corporate rules, and approved codes of
conduct.
'37 See Issuance of Safe Harbor Principles and Transmission to European Commission, 65
Fed. Reg. 45,666, 45,673-74 (July 24, 2000).
138 Id. at 45,670-71.
139 Id. at 45,673-74. Note that the SHA permits (but does not require) compensation to
individuals for losses incurred as a result of non-compliance.
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BBBOnline, and several other self-regulatory privacy programs
already in operation when the SHA took effect then developed Safe
Harbor programs specifically designed to satisfy (1) and (3). The
verification requirement is satisfied by self-assessment or third-party
compliance reviews.
The SHA has been described as an "uneasy compromise" between
the comprehensive regulatory approach of the E.U. and the self-
regulatory approach preferred by the U.S.14o This partly reflects the
fact that in providing the Privacy Principles and related documents
that form the SHA, the DOC lacked any direct statutory authority to
regulate online privacy and therefore had to rely solely on its enabling
statute, which only grants authority to foster, promote, and develop
international commerce. Applying Priest's typology, it is clear that
SHA seal programs more closely resemble regulatory self-
management programs than voluntary codes of conduct. One might
expect, therefore, that such programs would fare better than NAI in
demonstrating greater transparency, fewer free rider issues, better
coverage, and meaningful oversight and enforcement.141
Unfortunately, this is not borne out by the available evidence.142
First, as a government initiative, the SHA Privacy Principles are
highly transparent, at least in terms of DOC announcing the relevant
standards that industry would need to follow. But second, as noted
below, virtually no information is available regarding the performance
of firms in terms of these standards. Third, SHA seal programs fare
better than NAI in terms of formulating program guidelines that-at
least in theory-adhere to all of the Privacy Principles. However, both
the E.U. Study and the Galexia Study found that a high percentage of
140 See Chris Connolly, The US Safe Harbor - Fact or Fiction?, 96 PRIVACY L. AND Bus.
INT'L 1, 4 (2oo8).
141 See Damon Greer, The U.S.-E.U. Safe Harbor Framework, Presentation at the
Conference on Cross-Border Data Flows, Data Protection, and Privacy (20o7), available at
http://www.SafeHarbor.governmentools.us/documents/1A_DOC-Greer.ppt (suggesting
that DOC considers the SHA privacy framework a success).
142 The following analysis relies on (1) a 2004 report, prepared at the request of the EC and
based primarily on a survey of publicly available privacy policies of participating U.S.
companies; see JAN DHONT, ET. AL., SAFE HARBOUR AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTATION STUDY
105-07 (2004), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/studies/safe-harbour-2oo4_en.pdf
[hereinafter the EC Study]; and (2) a 2008 report by a British management consulting
firm called Galexia, which performed its own study based on the approximately 1,6oo
firms then listed on the Safe Harbor List. For a summary of the results, see Connolly,
supra note 140 [hereinafter the Galexia Study].
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participating firms did not incorporate all seven of the agreed upon
Privacy Principles in their own posted privacy policies.143 Fourth, the
SHA, like the NAI agreement, also suffers from both versions of the
free rider problem-many firms self-certify their adherence to the
Privacy Principles without even revising their posted privacy policies
in accordance with SHA requirements and, even if one excludes firms
that rely on alternative methods for demonstrating adequacy, the
roughly 2,000 participants on the DOC's Safe Harbor List represent
only a tiny fraction of firms that transfer data from the E.U. to the U.S.
Fifth, as to oversight and enforcement, the E.C. Study noted that no
complaints have been received and handled "despite frequent and
even flagrant inconsistencies and violations in implementation,"144
while according to the Galexia Study, fewer than one in four
companies registered for safe harbor were in compliance with the
Enforcement Principle and even fewer offered an affordable dispute
resolution process.145 Indeed, it was not until the summer of 2009 that
the FTC announced its first enforcement action against a U.S.
company for violation of the SHA.146
The SHA allows firms to meet the verification requirements of the
Enforcement Principle either through self-assessment or outside
143 See EC Study, id. (finding inadequate representation of various Privacy Principles,
misrepresentation of company memberships in self-regulatory programs, safe harbor
programs that did not incorporate all of the Privacy Principles, and weak implementation
of the Enforcement Principle); see also the Galexia Study, id. (finding that relatively few
participants published privacy policies reflecting all of the Principles as required by the
SHA; that a large number of firms failed to provide an independent recourse mechanism or
selected a mechanism that was not affordable, such as arbitration; and that many firms
claimed to be participants and continue to be accredited by self-regulatory SHA programs
even though they no longer appeared on the Safe Harbor List maintained by the DOC).
144 EC Study, id. at 107-o8.
45 Galexia Study, supra note 140, at 7.
146 See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Court Halts U.S. Internet Seller Deceptively
Posing as U.K. Home Electronics Site (August 6, 2009), available at
http://ftc.gov/opa/2oo9/o8/bestpriced.shtm (the FTC brought suit against a California
company for falsely claiming, in its privacy policy, that it was certified under the SHA when
in fact it was not). A few months later, the FTC announced proposed settlements in six
more false claims cases, suggesting that the Commission is stepping up its Safe Harbor
enforcement activity. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Settles with Six
Companies Claiming to Comply with International Privacy Framework (October 6, 2009),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/1o/safeharbor.shtm. This near absence of SHA
enforcement over the past eight years exacerbates the free rider problems since firms that
sign up for SHA and merely feign compliance or refuse to comply are unlikely to suffer any
adverse consequences.
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compliance reviews. Under the former, the firm must have in place
"internal procedures for periodically conducting objective reviews"
and must retain any relevant records. They must make the records
available upon request in the context of an investigation or a
complaint, but have no obligation to share this information with third
parties. The same record-keeping requirement applies in the case of
outside reviews subject to the same limitation. Thus, both internal and
external compliance reviews remain opaque, making it difficult to
draw any firm conclusions.147 Finally, while the SHA in theory fits
neatly under Priest's regulatory self-management category, in practice
it more closely resembles a voluntary code of conduct given the lack of
accountability to government, the free rider problems, the lax
monitoring of compliance by seal programs and government agencies,
and until quite recently, the absence of enforcement actions or
sanctions. In short, it displays none of the characteristics defining
second-generation strategies.
C. THE COPPA SAFE HARBOR
Congress enacted the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of
1998 (COPPA) to prohibit unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
connection with the collection, use, or disclosure of personal
information from and about children on the Internet. The statute4 8
and Final Rulel49 require operators of websites directed at children
and of general audience websites with actual knowledge that a user is
a child to meet five requirements: (1) notice; (2) parental consent
prior to the collection, use, and/or disclosure of personal information
from a child; (3) a right of parental review of such information; (4)
proportionality; and (5) reasonable security policies.15o
147 Although the DOC maintains a searchable online list of organizations that adhere to the
SHA principles and their certification and compliance status, it is not clear whether a
listing of "not current" under certification status has any enforcement implications. See
Dep't of Commerce, Safe Harbor List, available at https://safeharbor.export.gov/list.aspx
(showing that almost 2,500 organizations have self-certified, but that many of the listed
firms are shown as "non-current" under certification status).
148 Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA), Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 1302,
112 Stat. 2681-728 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §H 6501-06).
149 Children's Online Privacy Protection Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 59,888 (Nov. 3, 1999) (codified
at 16 C.F.R. pt. 312) [hereinafter COPPA Final Rule].
15o See COPPA, 15 U.S.C. § 6502 (2006); see also 16 C.F.R. § 312.3(a)-(e).
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COPPA provides both federal and state enforcement mechanisms
and penalties against operators who violate the provisions of the
implementing regulations.'5' The statute by its terms also establishes
an optional safe harbor program as an alternative means of
compliance for operators that follow self-regulatory guidelines, which
must be approved by the FTC under a notice and comment
procedure.152 There are three key criteria for safe harbor approval.
Self-regulatory guidelines must (1) meet or exceed the five statutory
requirements identified above; (2) include an "effective, mandatory
mechanism for the independent assessment of ... compliance with
the guidelines" such as random or periodic review of privacy practices
conducted by a seal program or third-party; and (3) contain "effective
incentives" to ensure compliance with the guidelines such as
mandatory public reporting of disciplinary actions, consumer redress,
voluntary payments to the government, or referral of violators to the
FTC.153
The avowed purpose of the COPPA safe harbor is to facilitate
industry self-regulation, and it does so in two ways. First, operators
that comply with approved self-regulatory guidelines are "deemed to
be in compliance" with all regulatory requirements.154 To benefit from
safe harbor treatment, operators need not individually apply for
approval as long as they fully comply with approved guidelines that
are applicable to their business. According to the COPPA Final Rule,
such compliance serves "as a safe harbor in any enforcement action"
under COPPA unless the guidelines were approved based on false or
incomplete information.55 Second, the safe harbor allows "flexibility
'5'See COPPA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6502(c) and 6504 (2006). In April 2002, the FTC conducted a
survey of the information collection practices of 144 children's websites and found that the
general trend of the sites is one of increased compliance, even though some COPPA
provisions, such as requirements about specific disclosures, have been followed less
consistently. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, PROTECTING CHILDREN'S PRIVACY UNDER COPPA: A
SURVEY ON COMPLIANCE (2002), available at
http://wwW.ftc.gov/os/2002/04/coppasurvey.pdf. The Commission has also settled fifteen
cases for violations of the COPPA Rule, including two that each resulted in civil penalties of
$1 million. See Fed. Trade Commission, Privacy Initiatives,
http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/privacyinitiatives/childrens-enf.html (last visited Mar. 14,
2011).
152 COPPA, 15 U.S.C. § 6503 (2006); see generally 16 C.F.R. § 312.10.
153 16 C.F.R. § 312.10(b)(2).
154 COPPA, 15 U.S.C. § 65o3(b)(2)(2006).
155 COPPA Final Rule, supra note 149, at 59, 906.
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in the development of self-regulatory guidelines" in a manner that
"takes into account industry-specific concerns and technological
developments."156 Industry groups interested in providing safe
harbors must submit their self-regulatory guidelines to the FTC for
approval.57 To date, the FTC has reviewed six safe harbor programs
and approved four of them. With all of the approved safe harbor
programs satisfying the three criteria set out in the preceding
paragraph, the COPPA safe harbor exemplifies Priest's regulatory self-
management category insofar as the statue sets regulatory policy and
rules but assigns program sponsors the responsibility for drafting self-
regulatory guidelines, implementing and operating the program, and
enforcement. A brief assessment of CARU's monitoring and
complaint-handling system shows the success of the safe harbor
program from an enforcement standpoint.s 8
Between 2000 and 2008, CARU reported on almost 200 cases; a
few originated in consumer complaints and the rest resulted from
CARU's routine monitoring of any website that may be reasonably
expected to attract children or teen users.159 Issues ranged from
inadequate privacy policies to the lack of a neutral age-screening
process to collection or disclosure of PII from children without
parental consent. The companies resolved all of the cases in question
by agreeing to change their practices as directed by CARU. In
156 Id. According to the FTC, self-regulatory programs are desirable because they "often can
respond more quickly and flexibly than traditional statutory regulation to consumer needs,
industry needs and a dynamic marketplace." See FED. TRADE COMM'N, IMPLEMENTING THE
CHILDREN'S ONLINE PRIVACY PROTECTION AcT: A FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N REPORT TO
CONGRESS (2007) 22-23, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/coppa/O7COPPAReport-to Congress.pdf [hereinafter FTC
COPPA REPORT].
15 See 16 C.F.R. § 312.10(C)(1)-(2) (providing that the FTC will then act on the application
within 18o days of the filing, and after the proposed guidelines have been subject to notice
and comment).
is8 CARU was established in 1974 by the National Advertising Division (NAD) of the
Council of Better Business Bureaus. Because the NAD maintains a publicly available
archive of case reports of all formally opened cases involving a website's failure to comply
voluntarily with the CARU guidelines, it is possible to evaluate CARU's track record of
compliance. The case reports are available upon request. See National Advertising
Division, Case Reports and Procedures,
http://www.nadreview.org/search/search.aspx?doctype=1&casetype= 2 (last visited Mar.
14, 2011).
159 All four approved safe harbor programs periodically monitor their member websites,
whereas CARIJ also monitors non-member websites.
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addition, CARU referred one case to the FTC that resulted in a
$400,000 settlement.160ln a second case, the respondent entered into
a consent decree with the FTC that included signing up for the CARU
safe harbor.161 And in a third case, the FTC initiated a COPPA lawsuit
based in part on CARU's determination of compliance
shortcomings.162 This is an impressive record considering that since
2000, the FTC has brought a total of only fifteen COPPA enforcement
cases. In short, CARU's compliance review and disciplinary
procedures clearly have been successful in complementing the FTC's
enforcement of COPPA, due in no small measure to its policy of
engaging in widespread monitoring of child-oriented websites as
opposed to members' sites only. This, in turn, allows the Commission
to focus its resources on higher profile matters.163
How well do COPPA safe harbor programs (and CARU, in
particular) fare when evaluated against the now familiar normative
criteria? Clearly, CARU harnesses industry expertise, but probably
costs more to operate than the NAI or SHA seal programs given its
extensive enforcement activities. Second, like the SHA, COPPA is very
strong on producing and reporting information regarding relevant
legal standards but weak on performance data.164 Third, as compared
to both the NAI and SHA, only the COPPA safe harbor programs
achieve full coverage of substantive privacy requirements as might be
expected given the FTC's mandatory review of program guidelines, all
of which must offer principles that "meet or exceed" statutory
i6o See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, UMG Recordings, Inc. to Pay $400,000 to
Settle COPPA Civil Penalty Charges (Sept. 13, 2006), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/20o4/02/bonziumg.shtm.
161 See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Imbee.com Settles FTC Charges Social
Networking Site for Kids Violated the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (Jan. 30,
2oo8), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2oo8/o1/imbee.shtm.
162 See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Website Targeting Girls Settles FTC Privacy
Charges (Oct. 21, 2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2001/1o/lisafrank.shtm.
163 See FTC COPPA REPORT, supra note 156, at 23-24.
164 The COPPA Rule was developed following a notice and comment procedure in which the
FTC received 132 comments in response to its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. The FTC
also held a public workshop seeking additional information on the issue of how to obtain
parental verification. See COPPA Final Rule, supra note 149, at 59,888. Although the
COPPA Rule requires periodic compliance reviews or other effective assessment
mechanisms, it makes no provision for publishing these reviews or any underlying data.
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requirements. 6s Fourth, free rider problems are minimal in the
COPPA safe harbor program because firms that resist joining an
approved program remain subject to the statutory requirements,
thereby deriving little competitive advantage from free riding.
Additionally, the number of CARU investigations seems high enough
to discourage feigned compliance by participating firms, especially
given CARU's willingness to refer cases to the Commission, and the
FTC's aggressive enforcement stance with respect to children's privacy
issues.166 Fifth, as to oversight and enforcement, COPPA requires that
approved safe harbor programs engage in ongoing monitoring of their
members' practices to ensure compliance with program guidelines
and the participant's own privacy notices. CARU's strong record of
investigating compliance issues identified in complaints or as a result
of routine monitoring (coupled with FTC's higher profile enforcement
actions) rebuts the usual charge that self-regulatory programs are
weak on enforcement.167 To the contrary, the COPPA safe harbor
programs, like other well-organized and committed industry groups,
"help free up scarce government regulatory resources to address the
recalcitrant few rather than the compliant majority." 68 The CARU
program stands out both for publishing case reports on non-member
compliance issues and for having, in fact, referred several cases to the
FTC.
Finally, while the CARU program is far superior to either the NAI
or SHA in terms of the preceding five criteria, it lacks many of the
attributes of second-generation regulatory strategies. There is no
i6s Indeed, as noted above, the COPPA Rule requires that applicants submit a comparison
of substantive requirements of the rule with the proposed guidelines and that the FTC act
on their request for approval only after subjecting the proposal to a formal notice and
comment procedure. This is not to say that every firm that participates in an approved
COPPA safe harbor program is in full compliance with the Rule. Rather, the point is that
the degree of completeness is directly related to the strength of the government's mandate
over the applicable self-regulatory scheme.
166See supra notes 159-162 and accompanying text.
167 The monitoring and complaint-handling records of the other three approved safe harbor
programs are more difficult to assess given the dearth of public documentation. However,
the complaint record of CARU is disappointing. Only a small number of the almost 200
investigations originated with consumer complaints (but all were resolved satisfactorily).
168 See Sinclair, supra note 6, at 537; AYERS & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 46, at 129 ("A
fundamental principle for the allocation of scare regulatory resources ought to be that they
are directed away from companies with demonstrably effective self-regulatory systems and
concentrated on companies that play fast and loose.").
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Coasian bargaining and too little industry buy-in. 69 Moreover, the
COPPA regulations are neither very flexible nor do they take into
account "industry-specific concerns and technological developments."
Although the Commission expressly characterized the assessment
mechanisms and compliance incentives described in the Final Rule as
"performance standards" that may be satisfied by equally effective
alternatives,17o a review of the self-regulatory guidelines of CARU,
Truste, ESRB and Privo shows relatively little differentiation by
sector, technology, or innovative methods of assessment or
compliance.171 This is at least partly the result of the safe harbor
approval process, which requires a side-by-side comparison of the
substantive provisions of the COPPA rule with the corresponding
provisions of the guidelines. The reason firms participate in safe
harbor programs is probably due less to regulatory flexibility, and
more to a desire to share in the brand recognition of the program seal,
to develop a closer working relationship with FTC staff, and to draw
on the additional expertise of program staff.
169 Indeed, very few firms have signed up for safe harbor programs. CARU has the fewest
members (about ten), while Privo has twenty-two, and ESRB and Truste each have about
thirty. See Email from Joanne Furtsch, Senior Privacy Architect, Truste, to Ira Rubinstein,
Adjunct Professor of Law, New York University School of Law (Sept. 17, 2009) (on file with
author); Telephone Interview with Phyllis B. Spaeth, Associate Director, CARU (Sept. 23,
2009); Telephone interview with Dona J. Fraser, Director, Privacy Online, ESRB (Sept. 28,
2009); Email from Stephen Kline, Vice President, Public Affairs, Privo, to Ira Rubinstein
(Sept. 29, 2009) (on file with author). All told, fewer than 100 firms have been certified
under approved safe harbor programs (although some of the ESRB and Truste
certifications cover multiple websites). The most likely explanation for this low rate of
participation is that deemed compliance is not a strong enough incentive to persuade firms
to bear the costs of joining a safe harbor program and abiding by its guidelines when they
have to comply with all but identical statutory requirements in any case. Moreover, the
COPPA Rule permits a firm to claim safe harbor benefits even though it has not joined a
program, but instead relies on internal processes for compliance and enforcement.
170 COPPA Final Rule, supra note 149 at 59,906-07 (stating that required assessment
mechanisms and compliance incentives are not considered as mandatory practices, but
rather as "performance standards," and that the listed methods are only "suggested means
for meeting these standards").
'7 Although ESRB is a trade association for the gaming industry and draws all of its
members from this sector, this is not reflected in any differences between its guidelines
and those of the other three COPPA safe harbor programs. In addition, although Privo is
unique in offering its own turnkey identity solution, which handles children's registration
and parental consent under COPPA, this seems more like a business decision than a direct
response to COPPA's "flexible" regulations.
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The three preceding case studies all describe well-established self-
regulatory programs and evaluates them against five public policy
criteria and a sixth criteria focusing on second-generation regulatory
strategies. This next section is different. It explores a few overseas
cases of privacy covenants under law and then hones in on a very
recent case in which U.S. firms, when threatened with prescriptive
regulation, chose to engage in a multi-stakeholder process (known as
the Global Network Initiative or GNI) to define privacy and free
speech principles for the Internet. While it is too soon to assess the
GNI against the public policy criteria, and while the GNI might fare
poorly in operational terms when compared to a statutory safe harbor
such as CARU, the GNI nevertheless points the way to the use of
mutually self-interested bargaining to achieve superior performance
by good actors.
D. PRIVACY COVENANTS
In his article discussing innovative environmental privacy tools,
Hirsch's primary examples of a privacy covenant are the Dutch codes
of conduct. Dutch data protection law (which is a comprehensive
statute implementing the E.U. Data Directive) allows industry sectors
to draw up codes for processing of personal data, which are then
submitted to the Dutch Data Protection Authority (DPA) for review
and approval.172 Specifically, organizations considered "sufficiently
representative" of a sector and that are planning to draw up a code of
conduct may ask the DPA for a declaration that "given the particular
features of the sector or sectors of society in which these organizations
are operating, the rules contained in the said code properly
implement" Dutch law.173 Article 25(4) of the PDPA further provides
that such declarations shall be "deemed to be the equivalent to" a
binding administrative decision, making it similar in effect to FTC
approval of COPPA safe harbor guidelines. According to Hirsch, the
DPA has approved at least twelve such codes covering various
industry sectors, each with its own tailored compliance plan that is
nevertheless consistent with the broader requirements of the Dutch
data protection law.174 Outside of Europe, other countries have
172 See the Dutch Personal Data Protection Act (PDPA), Chap. 3, Art. 25, available and
translated at http://www.dutchdpa.nl/downloads wetten/wbp.pdf.
173 Id.
174 Hirsch, supra note 66, at 54 - 56. This Dutch approach is generally consistent with
Article 27(1) of the E.U. Data Directive, which states that "Member States and the
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adopted a similar approach to privacy covenants. For example,
Australian privacy law also permits organizations to develop sectoral
privacy codes for the handling of personal information "designed to
allow for flexibility in an organization's approach to privacy," while at
the same time guaranteeing consumers "that their personal
information is subject to minimum standards that are enforceable in
law."7s Finally, New Zealand privacy law also treats approved codes of
conduct as instruments of law with binding effect.176
In the U.S., where comprehensive privacy law is lacking, there is
no possibility of firms or industry negotiating privacy covenants with
regulators, unless one wants to treat F1C consent decrees as a type of
covenant. Thus, the covenanting approach in the U.S. arises only
when there is a credible threat of federal privacy regulation and firms
sit down with regulators to negotiate a code of conduct in lieu of
regulation. In his article, Hirsch cites the OPA Guidelines as an
"incomplete" step towards a covenanting approach, and gives three
Commission shall encourage the drawing up of codes of conduct intended to contribute to
the proper implementation of the national provisions adopted by the Member States
pursuant to this Directive, taking account of the specific features of the various sectors."
See Council Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 134, at Article 27(1). Like the Netherlands,
Ireland also has approved several codes of practices under its data protection law. See Irish
Data Protection Commissioner, Self-Regulation and Codes of Practice,
http://www.dataprotection.ie/viewdoc.asp?DoclD=98 (last visited Feb. 3, 2011).
175 See OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PRIVACY COMMISSIONER, GUIDELINES ON PRIVACY CODE
DEVELOPMENT 16 (2001) [hereinafter Code Guidelines], available at
http://www.privacy.gov.au/materials/types/download/8634/6482. The relevant sections
of the Australian Privacy Act of 1988 impose detailed requirements that a privacy code
must satisfy to obtain approval. In particular, a code must incorporate all of the relevant
National Privacy Principles (NPPs, the Australian version of FIPPs) or set forth obligations
that are "at least the equivalent of" the NPPs; specify the organizations to which NPPs
apply; and permit organizations to develop their own complaint-handling procedures, such
as appointing the Privacy Commissioner or a third party as an independent adjudicator to
whom complaints may be made. See Privacy Act of 1988, No. 119 §§ 18BB(2)-(3) (1988)
(Austrl.). In addition, the Privacy Commissioner must be satisfied "that members of the
public have been given an adequate opportunity to comment on a draft of the code." Id. at §
18BB(2)(f). The Code Guidelines describe the public consultation requirement in greater
detail. Code proponents are required to submit a statement showing that they allowed at
least six weeks for consultation and describing who is affected by the code, efforts to
consult with affected groups, changes to the proposed code, a summary of any issues that
remain unresolved and why, and a list of organizations likely to adopt the code. See Code
Guidelines at 5-6. Although codes are voluntary, approved codes are legally binding on any
company that consents to be bound. See § 16A.
176 See Privacy Act of 1993, No. 28 § 46 (1993) (N.Z.).
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reasons for this incompleteness.177 A more recent and telling example
of a privacy covenant came about when three leading Internet firms
were accused of Internet censorship in China, resulting in a very
public controversy and threatened legislation.
In the winter of 2006, Yahoo!, Google and Microsoft had to
contend with highly unfavorable publicity and Congressional hearings
over their controversial roles in cooperating with Chinese government
efforts to monitor and censor the Internet and persecute dissidents.178
A few months later, Rep. Chris Smith introduced a bill that would
have rendered such practices illegal and forced U.S. companies to
confront a Hobson's choice: disregard restrictive Chinese licensing
requirements imposed on foreign companies as a condition of
providing Internet services in the Chinese market or obey Chinese
censorship rules in violation of U.S. law.179 The companies then sat
down with a cross-section of human rights organizations, socially
responsible investment firms, and academics, and agreed to work on
voluntary guidelines for protecting freedom of expression and privacy
on the Internet.1so After eighteen months of negotiations and
defections by several NGOs, the multi-stakeholder group reached
agreement and launched the GNI, jointly committing to a set of
principles and implementation guidelines as well as an accountability
'77See Hirsch, supra note 66, at 55 (noting three reasons for this incompleteness: (i) the
OPA guidelines were developed unilaterally, rather than in negotiations between the FTC
and industry, and privacy advocates were excluded, thereby resulting in weak standards;
(2) the FTC threatened but failed to issue prescriptive regulations, exacerbating free rider
problems; and (3) absent new legislation, the FTC gained no additional powers to enforce
the OPA guidelines).
178 Tom M. Zeller, Jr., Internet Firms Facing Questions about Censoring Internet Searches
in China, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2006, at C3. For a more detailed description of the incidents
involving each company, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, RACE TO THE BOTTOM: CORPORATE
COMPLICITY IN CHINESE INTERNET CENSORSHIP (20o6), available at
http://china.hrw.org/timeline/2oo6/raceto-the-bottom.
'79 Carrie Kirby, Chinese Internet vs. Free speech: Hard Choices for US Tech Giants, S.F.
CHRONICLE, Sept. 18, 2005, at Al.
x8o Other stakeholders included the Center for Democracy and Technology, the Electronic
Frontier Foundation, Human Rights First, Human Rights in China, Human Rights Watch,
the Calvert Group, Domini Social Investments, and F & C Asset Management. For a full list
of participants, see Participants,
http://www.globalnetworkinitiafive.org/participants/index.php (last visited Mar. 14,
20o1 1) .
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system based on independent, third-party assessments.S1 More
recently, a GNI member (Google) announced that it would shut down
its Chinese search engine rather than continuing to censor the
results,182 and began automatically redirecting Chinese customers to
an uncensored version of Google search hosted in Hong Kong.183
Why did Yahoo!, Google, and Microsoft agree to participate in a
multi-stakeholder process in which a successful outcome required
convening a group of actors with divergent interests (often at
loggerheads with each other), engaging in difficult and protracted
negotiations, and staying at the table until a consensus was forged? As
described above, the GNI negotiations were an entirely voluntary
effort, with no legal mandate as to process or substance. Rather, the
parties proceeded on an ad hoc basis and agreed to principles that,
while based on international human rights instruments, were not
subject to any formal approval criteria or government oversight.
Although the U.S. State Department welcomed the GNI initiative, it
did not participate in any stakeholder meetings. Cynics may say that
the three firms were merely responding to a public relations crisis
related to their business operations in China, which forced them to
pursue a covenanting approach not only to improve their public
image, but to restore public faith in their company integrity and
181 The guidelines state that companies should establish human rights risk assessment
procedures and integrate the findings into business decision-making; require that
governments follow established domestic legal processes when they are seeking to restrict
freedom of expression and privacy; provide users with clear, prominent and timely notice
when access to specific content has been removed or blocked; encourage governments,
international organizations, and entities to call attention to the worst cases of infringement
on the human rights of freedom of expression and privacy; and utilize independent
assessments of company implementation of the GNI principles. For the GNI's three core
commitment documents, see Global Network Initiative,
http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/index.php (last visited Feb. 3, 2011). Other
examples of multi-stakeholder processes designed to achieve basic human rights include
the Fair Labor Association Workplace Code of Conduct, the Equator Principles, the
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, and the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative.
182 See Kim Zetter, Google to Stop Censoring Search Results in China After Hack Attack,
Wired (Jan. 12, 201o), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/01/google-censorship-
china/ (last visited July 12, 2011).
183 See David Barboza & Miguel Heft, A Compromise Allows Both China and Google to
Claim a Victory, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2010, at Bi (describing how the Chinese authorities
agreed to re-issue Google's license for operating a Chinese search service with a website
that also contains a link to the uncensored version in Hong Kong).
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mollify Congressional demands for government intervention.184 But
even if GNI was initially spurred by negative publicity and a threat of
government intervention, it represents a moderately successfully
example of the covenanting approach at work.
Granted, negotiating the GNI covenants required a large
investment of time and resources by member firms (although perhaps
less than might have been required if Congress enacted the Smith
bill).'8 On the other hand, the GNI standards are highly transparent
and over time its accountability process will require both independent
assessments and annual Board reports evaluating each participating
company's compliance with the robust set of GNI Principles. 86 With
only three members, GNI suffers from severe free rider issues and it is
premature to comment on its oversight and enforcement record. In
short, GNI is not yet operating at the level of a statutory safe harbor
such as CARU. Yet GNI has already delivered on the promise of the
covenanting approach. For in the absence of a government-supervised
rulemaking process, the stakeholders relied on Coasian bargaining
principles-sharing credible information, developing trust based on
discussion of common interests, and staying at the bargaining table
for as long as necessary-to reach a voluntary agreement and establish
a fledgling organization to carry out its terms.
In sum, the preceding case studies have shown that the forms of
self-regulation in which government plays an increasingly larger role
are more likely to achieve regulatory success than purely voluntary
codes of conduct. In particular, a statutory safe harbor outperforms a
voluntary code such as the NAI, and a partially mandated approach
such as the SHA, across all five of the public policy criteria. This is
especially true as to completeness, lack of free rider problems, and, in
184See Neil Gunningham, Environment, Self-Regulation, and the Chemical Industry:
Assessing Responsible Care, 17 L. & POL'Y 57, 63 (1995) (citing these three factors as the
reason that large multinationals in the chemical industry established a voluntary initiative
known as Responsible Care in the wake of the Bhopal disaster).
185 The author has first-hand knowledge of these costs because he was lead privacy counsel
at Microsoft until September 2007 and attended the early rounds of GNI negotiations.
18 6 See GLOBAL NETWORK INITIATIVE, GOVERNANCE, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND LEARNING
FRAMEWORK (20o8), available at
http://www.globalnetworkinitiaive.org/cms/uploads//GNI_-
Governance_AccountabilityjLearning.pdf.
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CARU's case, oversight and enforcement. The review of privacy
covenants also highlights a number of subtly different aspects of
second-generation strategies. In the case of the GNI, the regulated
firms did not seek regulatory flexibility with respect to existing
statutes or regulations, but rather to avoid threatened regulation. The
talks occurred not at the sectoral level but at the firm level, and in
consultation with advocacy groups under a consensus model requiring
the approval of all parties based on Coasian bargaining. The resulting
principles were not legally binding but seem more than merely
precatory given the interest of the participating firms in preserving (or
restoring) their reputations for corporate citizenship. Taken together,
the set of four case studies suggests that future safe harbor programs
need to be overhauled in light of the second-generation strategies
illustrated by the GNI experience.
IV. SECOND-GENERATION STRATEGIES FOR PRIVACY REGULATION
Having established the superiority of statutory safe harbors over
other forms of self-regulation and the potential of privacy covenants
to achieve innovative regulatory solutions, we now turn to three
proposed second-generation regulatory strategies. All three leave
behind voluntary codes of conduct in favor of privacy covenants in
which the government plays a role by defining default requirements
and overseeing both implementation and enforcement.
The first is modeled on Hirsch's proposal of a "Project XL" for
experimental projects that would enable FTC to test out new, and
potentially better, regulatory approaches to privacy and to the
adoption of Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs). Assuming that
Congress enacts a comprehensive privacy law, the Commission could
then issue a notice defining the goals, criteria, and requirements of a
"Project XL for Privacy" program and invite interested parties to
submit proposals for experimental projects.187 The FTC would then
187 Of course, in the case of the EPA, environmental statutes and regulations already exist,
so Project XL can offer "regulatory flexibility" with respect to these standards in the hopes
of achieving superior environmental performance. In the case of the FTC, however, privacy
laws do not exist for most industries. Thus, under its existing regulatory authority, the FTC
might sponsor an XL-like program only in the context of the Financial Privacy Rule or
Safeguards Rule under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 68oi,
6804, & 6805(b)(2) (2000). But outside the context of the GLBA or a newly enacted
comprehensive privacy law, it makes little sense to speak of regulatory flexibility or
superior performance with respect to existing standards, which are the hallmarks of
Project XL. For a discussion of the FTC's rulemaking authority generally, including
whether it has the authority to issue privacy regulations and/or launch a XL-like program
under the FTC Act, see infra notes 205-209 and accompanying text.
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select the best proposals and enter into binding covenants with the
sponsors, who would run the projects as experiments subject to
agency evaluation and review. Part IV.A describes several innovative
ideas of varying scope and ambitiousness that might be suitably recast
as XL-like projects. These range from tools and techniques that
supplement FIPPs to cutting edge proposals that depart substantially
from the familiar control-based system of data protection at the heart
of FIPPs.
The second regulatory innovation is simply for the FTC to utilize
negotiated rulemaking in appropriate situations. Because negotiated
rulemaking presupposes that an agency has rulemaking authority, this
approach is limited to those areas where Congress has enacted privacy
laws authorizing the Commission to engage in rulemaking under the
APA. It seems likely that if Congress enacts privacy legislation, it will
grant the FTC authority to promulgate such regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the purposes of the new law.1s Under the NRA,
the FTC Chair may then determine if negotiated rulemaking would be
in the public interest.189 Part IV.B will specifically examine what
negotiated rulemaking involving behavioral advertising might look
like and why it might achieve better results than a rule based on notice
and comment.
The third and final approach also requires that Congress enact
comprehensive substantive privacy legislation. Thus, Part IV.C
assumes that any such law will include a safe harbor provision
modeled on § 6503 of COPPA, and sketches out how this safe harbor
would work if the incentives for participating and the process for
drafting and approving industry guidelines were substantially
modified in keeping with second-generation regulatory strategies.
A. PROJECT XL FOR PRIVACY
As discussed in Part II, the ability of consumers to control the
collection, use, and transfer of their personal data is a fundamental
aspect of any privacy regime centered on FIPPs. The control metaphor
assumes that consumers can understand the written privacy policies
they encounter online, thereby enabling meaningful consent
experiences. But informed consent is rarer than hens' teeth because
most online privacy notices are too long and complex, and too laced
188 As is the case with COPPA, supra note 148, the Boucher draft, supra note 14, at §
8(a)(3), and the Rush bill, supra note 15, at § 404.
189 See supra note 92.
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with legal jargon, for consumers to understand them. In response,
both the private sector and NGOs like the World Wide Web
Consortium (W3C) have developed various approaches for improving
the notice-and-choice experience. These include point solutions such
as use of multilayered notices,19o standardized table formats for
privacy policies,191 icons representing behavioral advertising
practices,192 experiments with "dashboards" that offer users greater
control and transparency over their account data,193 and improved
anonymization techniques that seek to address data retention
issues.194 AI of these tools and techniques may be characterized as
PETs.95 In 1997, W3C developed P3P, a computer protocol for helping
websites express their privacy practices in a standardized, machine-
readable format that could be automatically retrieved and interpreted
by tools built into browsers or separate applications. These tools allow
end users to set their own privacy preferences and thereby readily
Igo See THE CENTER FOR INFORMATION POLICY LEADERSHIP, MULTI-LAYERED NOTICES
EXPLAINED, http://www.hunton.com/files/tbl-s47Details/FileUpload265/1303/CIPL-
APECNoticesWhitePaper.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2011).
191 See P. Kelley, et al., Standardizing Privacy Notices: An Online Study of the Nutrition
Label Approach, paper presented at CHI 'lo Conference, available at
http://www.cylab.cmu.edu/files/pdfs/tech reports/CMUCyLabo9014.pdf.
192 See Future of Privacy Forum Releases Behavioral Notices Study (Jan. 27, 2010),
http://www.futureofprivacy.org/2010/01/27/future-of-privacy-forum-releases-
behavioral-notices-study/ (last visited July 12, 2011) (describing a study of behavioral
advertising disclosures using icons as an alternative to providing transparency and choice
via traditional online privacy notices).
'93 See Miguel Helft, Google to Offer Ads Based on Interests, With Privacy Rights, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 11, 20o9, at B3 (describing service that summarizes the data that Google
collects from users' accounts).
194 See Miguel Heft, Yahoo Puts New Limits On Keeping User Data, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18,
2oo8, at B3 (describing differences in data retention periods among leading search engine
providers and quoting a Microsoft spokesman as stating that "the method of
anonymization is more important than the anonymization timeframe").
195 See ANNE CAVOUKIAN, & TYLER J. HAMILTON, THE PRIVACY PAYOFF: How SUCCESSFUL
BUSINESSES BUILD CONSUMER TRUST 252 (2002) (noting that the first use of this term
appeared in Privacy-Enhancing Technologies: The Path to Anonymity, a 1995 joint report
of the Dutch Data Protection Authority and the Ontario Information Privacy
Commissioner, co-edited by Ronald Hes and John Borking). For an early overview of PETs,
see Herbert Burket, Privacy-Enhancing Technologies: Typology, Critique, Vision, in
TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE 125 (Philip E. Agre & Marc Rotenberg
eds.) (1998) (defining PETs as "[seeking] to eliminate the use of personal data altogether or
to give direct control over revelation of personal information to the person concerned").
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determine whether a website's practices are consistent with their own,
with the goal of making users better equipped to make informed
choices.196
These initiatives all tend to follow a similar pattern. Sponsors
launch the new PET with overly enthusiastic claims about its benefits,
while at least a few privacy advocates denounce the PET as a
subterfuge devised by industry mainly for the purpose of blocking new
privacy legislation. For its part, the FTC may offer qualified support of
the new PET in testimony, staff reports, speeches, or industry
consultations, but refrains from taking a stance on any disputed
regulatory issues. P3P is a paradigmatic case. Although W3C
presented P3P as part of a larger, more comprehensive set of technical
and legal solutions and never contended that it solved all privacy
concerns on the Web,197 Microsoft, AOL and Netscape behaved as if it
largely obviated the need for an omnibus privacy law.198 Meanwhile,
EPIC and others condemned P3P harshly on numerous grounds.199
Finally, while the FTC supported P3P to the extent of testifying that a
new privacy law might interfere with P3P's broad adoption by
imposing incompatible notice requirements, the Commission never
sought to resolve any of the legal issues concerning P3P that may have
slowed its deployment.200
Project XL offers an alternative approach to this stalemate. As
noted previously, experimental XL projects require a firm, trade
196 See World Wide Web Consortium, The Platform for Privacy Preferences 1.1 (P3Pi-1)
Specification, http://www.w3.org/TR/P3P11/ (last visited July 12, 2011).
197 See World Wide Web Consortium, P3P and Privacy FAQ,
http://www.w3.org/P3P/P3pfaq.html#solve (last visited July 12, 2011).
198 See, e.g., Glenn R. Simpson, The Battle Over Web Privacy: As Congress Mulls New
Laws, Microsoft Pushes a System That's Tied to Its Browser, WALL ST. J., March 21, 2001,
at Bi.
199 See, e.g., Electronic Privacy Information Center & Junkbusters Corp., Pretty Poor
Privacy: An Assessment of P3P and Internet Privacy (2000), available at
http://www.epic.org/reports/prettypoorprivacy.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2011).
200 See S. 2201, Online Personal Privacy Act, Hearing on S. 2201 Before the Comm. on
Commerce, Science and Transportation, lo7th Cong. 11 (2002) (statement of Tim Muris,
Chairman, Fed. Trade Commission), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=1o7 senatehearings&docid=f:91368.pdf. The worrisome legal
issues included the extent to which P3P policies were legally binding and/or fully
discharged legal obligations under applicable notice and choice requirements, and how
websites should deal with limitations of the P3P vocabulary, which made it difficult to
express company privacy policies in P3P code.
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association, or standards organization to submit to the FTC a proposal
describing their new initiative in detail, including how it does a better
job of protecting consumer privacy, whether it has the support of
various stakeholders, and what changes, if any, in existing (or new)
regulations might be required. Thus, innovative ideas developed
within a Project XL framework not only could achieve greater
regulatory certainty for their sponsors and early adopters, but might
also win the support of advocacy groups if they were consulted at the
outset and given an opportunity to review a PET's design and
implementation before it was set in stone. Ideally, all of the
stakeholders would discuss whether the new approach achieves a high
enough standard of privacy protection to justify regulatory relief, such
as the FTC establishing clear guidelines for ensuring that P3P policies
harmonize with written privacy statements while treating them as
enforceable promises.2o1 Certainly, a high profile project like P3P
would have benefited from a more collaborative process in which all
affected parties and the regulators worked together to embrace P3P's
strong points rather than squabbling over its weak points.
In addition to experimenting with PETs that help implement
FIPPs, the XL process also might be appropriate for exploring new
approaches to privacy protection that refocus or even supplant FIPPs.
For example, Fred Cate has suggested a new approach that
emphasizes tangible harms. Cate argues that despite their lofty goals,
FIPPs fail in practice by "maximizing consumer choice" rather than
"protecting privacy while permitting data flows."202 He has outlined a
revised version of FIPPs with new principles emphasizing the
prevention of harm, the maximization of individual and public
benefits through the balancing of the value of accessible personal
information and information privacy, and more consistent privacy
protection across all types of data, settings, and jurisdictions. In
shifting attention from notice and choice to tangible harms, Cate's
proposed principles also emphasize substantive rather than
procedural protections.2o3
201 See William McGiveran, Note, Programmed Privacy Promises: P3P and Web Privacy
Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1812 (2001) (recommending that lawmakers combine P3P code
with market forces and a legal rationale based on enforcement of promises).
202 See Fred H. Cate, The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles, in CONSUMER
PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE 'INFORMATION ECONOMY' 369 (Jane K. Winn ed., 2006).
203 Similarly, a group of MIT researchers argue that a privacy regime premised on
controlling and preventing access to information no longer works given the ease of sharing
data and the large-scale aggregation and searching of data across multiple sources. Their
new approach is based on transparency and accountability of data use, and their work
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Of course, not every privacy-enhancing initiative needs or deserves
an XL project. In the environmental arena, the benefits of Project XL
are reasonably clear: regulatory flexibility, reduced compliance costs,
and greater certainty regarding the regulatory implications of using
new technologies or more integrated approaches. But privacy law is
not nearly as hard and fast as environmental regulation, nor is FTC
enforcement as extensive or costly as the EPA's civil, clean-up, and
criminal enforcement programs. As a result, only a handful of highly
regulated privacy leaders are likely to pursue a privacy-related XL
project given the burdens of doing so and the high standards that the
stakeholders and the FTC would require to obtain any guarantee
of regulatory relief.204 Nor would an FTC version of Project XL
necessarily overcome the flaws in the original program, such as the
need for baseline requirements, better guidance regarding stakeholder
participation, and (absent a statute) a lack of clear legal authority. But
the FTC could mitigate these problems by learning from the EPA
experience and following Hirsch's advice: select a few meritorious
projects with clear goals, devise an appropriate stakeholder process,
and postpone any broader policy decisions until the experimental
projects have been thoroughly scrutinized.
B. NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING AND ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING
Should the FTC engage in negotiated rulemaking when issuing
rules governing the online collection of personal information? Before
considering the potential advantages of this approach, a brief
discussion of the FTC's rulemaking authority is needed, given that it
stems from two quite different sources. The first is Section 18 of the
FTC Act, under which the Commission has limited authority to
prescribe rules defining "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
describes a new technical architecture for promoting informational accountability. See
Daniel J. Weitzner, et al., Information Accountability, 51 COMM. OF THE Ass'N FOR
COMPUTING MACHINERY 82, 86 (2008) (arguing that "privacy is protected not by limiting
the collection of data, but by placing strict rules on how the data may be used").
Additionally, the Business Forum for Consumer Privacy has proposed a new "use-and-
obligations" model for implementing FIPPs based on Cate's work. See Bus. FORUM FOR
CONSUMER PRIVACY, A USE AND OBLIGATIONS APPROACH TO PROTECTING PRIVACY: A
DISCUSSION DOCUMENT (2oo9), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/privacyroundtable/5445o6-ooo58.pdf
204 This point was suggested to me by Lisa Sotto.
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affecting commerce."205 The second would be a new privacy law
authorizing the FTC to issue implementing regulations.
Before commencing rulemaking under Section 18, the
Commission must jump over the high hurdles set by Congress in 1980
in response to perceived abuses of the agency's rulemaking authority.
These requirements include advance rulemaking notice to Congress
and the public, public hearings at which interested parties have
limited rights of cross-examination, and a statement of basis and
purpose addressing both the prevalence of the acts or practices
specified by the rule and its economic effect.206
On the other hand, when Congress grants the FTC rulemaking
authority to address a more narrowly focused problem under a
specific statute, the Commission may, at its discretion, rely on the
notice and comment rulemaking procedures followed by most federal
agencies or on negotiated rulemaking. In the past, the Commission
has followed APA procedures in issuing rules regulating children's
privacy,207 financial privacy,208 and the standards for commercial
205 See 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(2).
206 See 15 U.S.C. § 57a(b)(1)-(2). See generally JULJAN 0. VON KALINOWSKI ET AL.,
ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 5.14 (1997). The FTC's limited
rulemaking authority under § 18 merits some further explanation, although readers mainly
interested in negotiated rulemaking may safely skip this footnote. Due to the burdensome
and time-consuming procedures imposed by § 18, the FTC often prefers to rely on strategic
enforcement actions to achieve its regulatory goals. This seems consistent with published
statements of how the Commission views its options for regulating privacy practices. For
example, in a July 14, 2000 letter to the EC explaining the agency's jurisdiction over such
practices, former Chairman Pitofsky indicated that while § 5 clearly provides a legal basis
for enforcement actions against firms that misrepresent their privacy practices (deceptive
practices) or that fail to secure their customers' personal information (unfair practices), "it
currently may not be within the FTC's power to broadly require that entities collecting
information on the Internet adhere to a privacy policy or to any particular privacy policy."
See Issuance of Safe Harbor Principles, supra note 137, at 45,883-85. More recent
statements by Leibowitz and Vladeck suggest that the Commission is reconsidering this
policy as a result of dissatisfaction with a consumer privacy strategy based primarily on
enforcement and self-regulation. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text. If
Congress does not enact new substantive privacy law, it will be interesting to see if the
Commission rethinks the appropriateness of using § 18 to promulgate a rule requiring
adherence to FIPPs. Although an early draft of the recently enacted financial reform bill
included a provision amending § 57a(b) of the FTC Act to allow the Commission to
promulgate rules defining unfair or deceptive practices using conventional rulemaking
procedures under the APA, without having to observe any additional procedural
safeguards, this amendment was dropped from the final version of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009. See Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 4901 (2009).
207 See COPPA, 15 U.S.C. § 6503(b)(1).
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email marketing.209 But nothing prevents it from initiating a
negotiated rulemaking in the future if it were to modify an existing
rule under COPPA, GLBA or CAN-SPAM; or, in the alternative, if
Congress were to enact new, substantive privacy legislation and the
statute specifically authorized the Commission to engage in APA
rulemaking.
With these preliminaries taken care of, if Congress passes a bill
along the lines suggested by Rep. Boucher, the FTC should rely on
negotiated rulemaking to address the privacy concerns raised by
behavioral targeting. The Boucher draft already includes a safe harbor
provision in Section 3(e), which exempts advertising networks that
track online behavior from having to obtain explicit, opt-in consent
provided that they allow consumers to view and modify, or opt out of
entirely, the profile maintained about them for advertising purposes,
and directs the FTC to promulgate a rule implementing this
provision.210 As discussed previously, negotiated rulemaking is most
beneficial when the underlying rule requires information sharing
between the regulators, the regulated industry, and other affected
parties, and when the parties believe they have something to gain
from working together and achieving a compromise.211 Arguably, these
conditions would be met if the FTC formed a negotiated rulemaking
committee to tackle a safe harbor rule addressing behavioral
targeting.
A negotiated rulemaking for behavioral targeting may strike the
reader as quixotic. After all, industry's bottom line is to maintain the
free flow of information including personal data needed for ad
targeting, which in turn increases advertising revenues. Hence, it
strongly favors an opt-out regime backed by accountability measures
such as compliance reviews conducted by trade associations.
Advocates, on the other hand, seek more meaningful protection from
intrusive profiling. Hence, they demand legislative solutions based on
opt-in choice, a broader definition of PII, very short data retention
periods, and external audits. These differences are deep-seated and
perhaps ideological, and thus not easily overcome. Yet there is reason
to believe that all of the affected parties-the regulated industry, the
20$ See GLBA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 68oi, 6804, 6805(b)(2).
209 See Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing (CAN-SPAM)
Act of 2003, 15 U.S.C. § 7711.
2xoSee Staff of Richard Boucher, supra note 14.
2-1 See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
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advocates representing the public interest, and the regulators-might
be highly motivated to engage in face-to-face negotiations and would
benefit from the information sharing that inevitably occurs in this
setting.
As to motivation, industry should first recognize that if Congress
enacts a new privacy law, it is very likely to regulate behavioral
targeting, while if Congress fails to act, Leibowitz and Vladeck are very
likely to reject further self-regulation as inadequate and instead
pursue a far more aggressive enforcement strategy or even a new
rulemaking directed at behavioral targeting practices (assuming they
determine that the FTC has sufficient rulemaking authority under
Section 18).12 Second, advocates should realize that they face an
uphill battle in persuading Congress that new privacy legislation
would have no negative economic impacts on the online advertising
revenues that currently subsidize free online content and services, or
that a drop in these revenues won't result in higher costs for
consumers. Third, the FTC is not yet locked into any one approach. To
the contrary, when Leibowitz was recently asked what people should
expect from the FTC's roundtable series on privacy and where the
agency was headed, he answered, "I can honestly say: we don't know.
Our minds are open."213
Finally, as to information sharing, the negotiated rulemaking
process by its very nature encourages more credible transmission of
information among the parties. To begin with, the network advertising
industry undoubtedly possesses greater expertise and insight into the
complex technology and evolving business models underlying OBA
than either privacy advocates or FTC staff. In the past, this
information has been shared or elicited mostly through one-sided
communications-unilateral codes of conduct, complaints filed with
the FTC, or charges and countercharges at public forums. In a
212 See supra note 206.
213 See JON LEIBOWITZ, CHAIRMAN, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, INTRODUCTORY REMARKS AT
THE FTC's EXPLORING PRIVACY-A ROUNDTABLE SERIES (Dec. 7, 2009), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/o91o7privacyremarks.pdf; see also Vladeck
Interview, supra note 43 (when asked what he meant by clearer notice and consent,
Vladeck stated, "I don't want to suggest that we've prejudged anything. I think the key is
transparency across the board .... I don't know whether we'd gravitate toward a universal
opt-in"). On December 1, 2010, the FTC issued its report on the roundtables; see FED.
TRADE COMMISSION (BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION), A PRELIMINARY FTC STAFF
REPORT ON PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: A PROPOSED
FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS (Dec. 2010), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2olo/12/1o12o1privacyreport.pdf. FTC [hereinafter FTC Proposed
Framework].
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negotiated rulemaking process, however, the logic of Coasian
bargaining prevails. In other words, each party seeks to "maximize its
share of the gains produced by departure from standard
requirements" and this requires that parties "educate each other, pool
knowledge, and cooperate in problem solving."214 In short, when both
sides engage in explicit bargaining over priorities and tradeoffs, they
are far more likely to achieve a satisfactory compromise than by
relying on the indirect communications that characterize conventional
notice and comment rulemaking.
C. STATUTORY SAFE HARBORS REVISITED
The previous section examined the potential use of negotiated
rulemaking in the event that Congress enacted a new law that
included a safe harbor exemption for firms that collect and use data
for OBA purposes, provided they follow certain specified practices.
This section offers a much broader look at how Congress might
integrate the covenanting approach into any new privacy legislation by
including a revamped safe harbor provision. Assume for the sake of
argument that Congress enacts privacy legislation requiring websites
that collect information from Internet users to follow default
requirements based on FIPPs, unless they participate in an approved
safe harbor modeled on §6503 of COPPA. A modest approach to
redesigning this safe harbor might be to add several new elements
based on the Dutch and Australian privacy codes discussed above. For
example, Congress might grant the FTC broad discretion to approve
self-regulatory guidelines for different industry sectors so long as (1)
the organization seeking approval is sufficiently representative of the
sector; (2) industry members consult with other interested parties,
including privacy and consumer advocacy groups, and/or engage in
direct negotiations with them; (3) industry clearly justifies any
derogation from FIPPs; (4) the Commission reviews industry
guidelines under a notice and comment process before final approval;
and (5) approved guidelines bind only those companies that chose to
participate.215
214 See Freeman & Langbein, supra note 70, at 69. For a very similar point, see Morriss,
supra note 94, at 201 (observing that "agencies may need the negotiation process to allow
one set of interests to make credible commitments or disclosures to another set of interests
that enable the regulation to be recognized as a Pareto improvement").
215 Compare the Rush bill, supra note 15, at §§ 401-404. The Choice Program enables
firms to qualify for certain exemptions provided the program meets the following five
requirements: (i) a "universal" opt-out mechanism and preference management tool that
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Of course, this brief description raises more questions than it
answers. Which trade associations should FTC work with, especially if
there are competing organizations with overlapping membership?
How are firms and NGOs selected and how many should participate?
May a large firm that has several different divisions and belongs to
several trade groups participate in multiple negotiations and assume
obligations under multiple codes? What about smaller firms that may
not belong to any trade association? How do they ensure proper
representation in negotiations that might affect them?216 If NGOs lack
the necessary resources to staff negotiation sessions (which seems
very likely), should government or industry help fund their
participation? Should there be a specified period for completion of
negotiations and/or submission of a draft code? Should negotiations
occur in open sessions or behind closed doors, with only stakeholders
in attendance? If a firm or NGO walks out on the negotiating process,
does the FTC retain discretion to commence a notice and comment
process for a code that it nevertheless considers satisfactory? The
negotiated rulemaking process answers many of these questions, so
perhaps Congress should encourage its use as the principal (but not
exclusive) method of approving proposed safe harbor programs under
a new privacy law.
For a new safe harbor program to have much likelihood of success,
Congress would also need to ensure that industry did not view privacy
codes as requiring a high expenditure of resources while offering too
few tangible benefits (as seems to be the case with both COPPA and
the Australian privacy codes). This requires not only well-designed
legislation but far more deliberate attention than existing schemes
give to developing the right combination of incentives. As to the
design issue, Congress could define specific standards as a default, but
then allow the FTC to negotiate tailored requirements with industry
trade groups; adherence to these requirements would then substitute
applies an individual's choices to all firms participating in the program; (2) guidelines and
procedures that offer equivalent or greater protections than those required in Title I
(transparency, notice and individual choice) and Title II (accuracy, access and dispute
resolution); (3) approval procedures for participating firms; (4) procedures for periodic
self-assessment and random compliance testing; and (5) consequences for failure to
comply with program requirements. Qualifying firms are not subject to the express
affirmative consent requirements under § 104(a), the access requirement under § 202(b),
or liability in a private right of action brought under § 604.
216 Arguably, a well-organized industry with broad trade association membership is a pre-
condition for the sector-based covenanting approach. However, firms that do not belong to
a trade association should be permitted to adapt the model rules of any trade association in
their industry sector. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 46, at 121.
2 011] 4 15
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
for compliance with the default standards. Those firms that did not
sign up for a code of conduct still would have to comply with the
default requirements, thereby addressing the free-rider problem. But
the FTC would need to pay more than lip service to allowing flexibility
in the development of industry guidelines and to taking into account
industry-specific concerns and technological developments.
As to incentives, Congress should use both sticks and carrots. 2 17 In
the environmental setting, sticks typically include a threat of stricter
regulations or the imposition of higher pollution fees. Carrots might
take the form of more flexible regulations, recognition of better
performance by the government, and cost-savings such as exemptions
from mandatory reporting, or easier and quicker permitting. Firms
that demonstrate high performance avoid these sticks and/or enjoy
these carrots. What sticks and carrots might be devised to enhance a
new privacy safe harbor, given that the COPPA safe harbor relied
primarily on deemed compliance and a largely empty promise of
regulatory flexibility? Over the years, many advocacy groups and
privacy scholars have favored a private right of action and liquidated
damages as enforcement mechanisms in any new privacy legislation.
Not surprisingly, industry has argued that such remedies are both
unnecessary and ineffective. This suggests that a tiered liability system
might make an excellent stick. Under this approach, new privacy
legislation would allow civil actions and liquidated damage awards
against firms that did not participate in an approved safe harbor
program. In sharp contrast, compliance with approved self-regulatory
guidelines would not only serve as a safe harbor in any enforcement
action, but also protect program participants from civil lawsuits and
monetary penalties.218
While tiered liability is a novel concept in privacy law, it is worth
pointing out that Black's Law Dictionary defines safe harbor as a
"provision (as in a statute or regulation) that affords protection from
liability or penalty"219 and that such safe harbors are extremely
common statutory devices. For example, Section 102 of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act (PLSRA)220 provides a safe harbor for
projections of future economic performance if they meet a (much
217 See FIORINO, supra note 66, at 124.
218 See supra note 15, at § 604.
219 See BLACK'S LAW DIcrIONARY 1140 (Abridged 9th ed. 2005) (defining "safe harbor").
220 15 U.S.C- § 78-u5(1 9 9 5 ).
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litigated) standard of good faith. Similarly, the safe harbor under
Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 2 2 1 seeks to
immunize Internet service providers from copyright liability if they
adhere to certain guidelines designed to protect the rights of authors.
In contrast, the Section 230 safe harbor in the Communications
Decency Act 2 2 2 provides complete immunity from liability for
providers and users of an "interactive computer service" who publish
information provided by others.
Not all safe harbors shield participants from liability, however.
Some safe harbor programs take the form of exemptions from
statutory requirements. For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 does not apply to private sector employers with fourteen or
fewer employees.223 And the California security breach notification
law only imposes its notice requirement on "unencrypted data."224
Finally, some safe harbors permit regulated entities to engage in
desired behavior provided that they meet certain conditions. For
example, as noted above, the SHA treats U.S. firms that self-certify as
providing an adequate level of privacy protection and thereby enables
transfers of E.U. data to the U.S. Under the COPPA safe harbor
program, participating firms are deemed to be in compliance with all
statutory requirements.225 Similarly, financial institutions regulated
by the GLBA that use the model privacy form described in Appendix A
to the Privacy Rule are deemed to be in compliance with the rule's
notice requirements.226
As to carrots, they might include official government recognition
of superior performance by top-tier performers in safe harbor
programs (while non-participating firms would be ineligible for such
recognition), as well as certain purchase preferences. The federal
government gives a preference to Energy Star products. Why not also
give a preference to email, search, or other internet technologies or
services acquired from safe harbor firms?
221 17 U.S.C. § 512 (1998).
222 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2000).
223 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1964).
224 See CAL. CIV. CODE. § 1798.82.
225 See supra note 154.
226 See 16 C.F.R. § 313.2 (2009).
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The last few paragraphs describe a proposed regulatory strategy in
which federal privacy law would formally recognize differences in
performance by treating safe harbor participants differently from non-
participants. This is true of all safe harbor schemes. Their function is
to shield or reward regulated firms if they engage in desirable
behavior as defined by statute. A few safe harbor provisions, like the
small business exemption under Title VII, leave no doubt as to
whether a regulated firm qualifies for differential treatment. But this
is unusual. More often than not, the conditions for eligibility are
sufficiently complex that litigation is required to sort them out, and
even then the courts often disagree.227
What, then, are the privacy practices that industry must follow to
be eligible for safe harbor treatment? Before addressing this key issue,
a brief summary of the argument so far is in order. Any privacy
legislation that Congress is likely to enact is bound to address the core
FIPPs: notice, consent, access, data security, data minimization, data
integrity, accountability, and enforcement. Under such a statute, firms
would be obliged to provide notice via a privacy statement, offer
relevant consent choices depending on their data collection and use
practices, provide reasonable access to personal data and a limited
ability to correct or amend that data, and implement reasonable
security practices. Mere compliance with these legal requirements
should not entitle a firm to safe harbor treatment. Rather, one of the
purposes of second-generation strategies like those described in the
previous section is to distinguish good performers from bad
performers, and to treat them accordingly. This means reserving safe
harbor benefits (both availability of carrots and avoidance of sticks)
for firms that sign up for a sectoral agreement that goes beyond mere
227 For example, courts have disagreed on whether the PLSRA safe harbor immunizes
forward-looking statements that are accompanied by "meaningful cautionary statements"
if the statements were false and made with actual knowledge of their falsity. Compare
Freeland v. Iridium World Comm., 545 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2008) with Beaver County
Ret. Bd. v. LCA-Vision Inc., No. 1:07-CV-750, 2009 WL 806714 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 25, 2009).
For an example of denying safe harbor protection under DMCA § 512 to firms that use
peer-to-peer networking systems to facilitate file sharing over the Internet, see A & M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F-3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); see also In re Aimster
Copyright Litigation, 35 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 648 (N.D. Ill. 2002), affd, 334 F-3d 643 (7th
Cir. 2003). And for an example of denying § 230 immunity to an online roommate
matching service that was potentially liable under the Fair Housing Act for requiring
members to answer questions that potentially enabled other members to discriminate for
or against them, see Fair Housing Council of San Fernando valley v. Roommate.com, LLC,
521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
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compliance as determined by suitable performance measures.228
Obviously, this requires reliable performance measures, such as (in
the environmental field) exceeding targeted goals for reducing
pollution or emissions.229 Arguably, privacy performance is harder to
measure than air or water quality given not only "the vagueness and
contestability" of the meaning of privacy, but also the lack of any
meaningful quantitative indicators.230 At the very least, the science of
measuring privacy performance is in the early stages of development.
What steps firms should take to achieve higher levels of privacy
protection for consumers is a very large and complex topic, and well
beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice to say that these steps are likely
to include three components: data governance, privacy
methodologies, and best practices.231
228 See FIORINO, supra note 66, at 200-01 (describing how agencies might incorporate
performance tiers into regulations by defining criteria for differentiating among firms and
deciding how top performers should be treated differently).
229 See supra note 67.
230 See COLIN J. BENNETI & CHARLES D. RAAB, THE GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY: POLICY
INSTRUMENTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 242 (2006) (noting several difficulties in evaluating
the quality of data protection).
231 For a preliminary description of a holistic approach to privacy protection incorporating
all three subcomponents, a good source is a Discussion Document prepared for the U.K.
Information Commissioner's Office. See CONSUMER FOCUS, THE BUSINESS CASE FOR
INVESTING IN PROACTIVE PRIVACY PROTECTION (20o9), available at
http://www.consumerfocus.org.uk/assets/1/files/2009/11/TheBusinessCaseforlnvestingin
ProactivePrivacyProtection.pdf For more on data governance, see, e.g., EUR. COMMISSION,
OPINION 3/2010 ON THE PRINCIPLE OF ACCOUNTABILITY, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2010/wpl73_en.pdf; see also
various materials from the Center for Information Policy Leadership's project on
Accountability-Based Privacy Governance,
http://www.hunton.com/Resources/Sites/general.aspx?id=965 (last visited Feb. 3, 2011).
Privacy methodologies are sometimes discussed under the rubric of Privacy by Design. See,
e.g., EUR. COMMISSION, A DIGITAL AGENDA FOR EUROPE (2010), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:o245:FIN:EN:HTML
(describing "the principle of privacy by design" in terms of embedding privacy and data
protection throughout the entire lifecycles of technologies, from the early design stage to
their deployment, use and ultimate disposal); see also FTC Proposed Framework, supra
note 213 at 44-52 (identifying privacy by design as one of three major recommendations
resulting from the roundtables). In addition, Joint Technical Committee 1 of the
International Standards Organization (ISO) is examining the relation of privacy to
information technology. In particular, Subcommittee 27 (SC 27), IT Security Techniques, is
working on several projects, including its "Privacy Framework," "Privacy Reference
Architecture," and "Proposal on a Privacy Capability Assessment Model." See IT Security
Techniques,
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Much work remains to be done on the necessary and sufficient
criteria for improving privacy performance, and on how exactly they
might be translated into performance measures for purposes of safe
harbor eligibility. Two points are clear, however. First, government
should rely principally on the private sector, academia, and
international standards bodies for further development of the holistic
approach described above. Second, government should not attempt to
define performance measures. Rather, it should support existing
efforts to develop such measures by funding academic research;
encouraging U.S. trade associations and firms to participate in
international standards efforts; and, as these standards mature,
promoting market demand through purchasing criteria, giving
preferred regulatory treatment to firms that meet these emerging
requirements, or expressly adopting privately generated standards in
public regulation.232
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Whatever its shortcomings, and despite its many critics, self-
regulation is a recurrent theme in the U.S. approach to online privacy,
and perhaps a permanent part of the regulatory landscape in America.
This Article's goal has been to consider new strategies for overcoming
observed weaknesses in self-regulatory privacy programs. It began by
examining the FTC's intermittent embrace of self-regulation, and
found that the Commission's most recent foray into self-regulatory
guidelines for online behavioral advertising is not very different from
earlier efforts, which ended in frustration and a call for legislation. It
argued that any attempt to treat this privacy debate exclusively in
terms of voluntary codes versus prescriptive regulation rests on a false
dichotomy that needs to be abandoned in favor of more innovative
regulatory solutions.
http://www.iso.org/iso/iso catalogue/catalogue-tc/cataloguegtc_browse.htm?commid=
453o6&development=on (last visited Mar. 14, 2011).
232 Once again environmental law provides insights into these policy instruments. See, e.g.,
Hirsch, supra note 66, at 60-63 (discussing Environmental Management Systems (EMSs)
as a model for using organizational practices and procedures to improve privacy); see also
FIORINO, supra note 66, at 144-49 (describing the EPA's National Environmental
Performance Track, which gives special treatment to firms meeting four criteria: (1)
sustained compliance with environmental law, (2) use of an EMS, (3) public outreach, and
(4) committing to continuous improvement in environmental performance); Errol E.
Meidinger, Environmental Certification Programs and U.S. Environmental Law: Closer
Than You May Think, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10, 162 (2001) (describing environmental
certification programs and how they are incorporated into legal systems).
[Vol. 6:3420
RUBINSTEIN
Next, it identified different types of self-regulation and then
examined the co-regulatory approach based on covenants, using
Coasian bargaining principles to explain why environmental
covenants such as Project XL and negotiated rulemaking were likely to
achieve a superior outcome as compared to conventional rulemaking.
It also developed a normative framework consisting in six factors
(efficiency, transparency and openness, completeness, addressing free
rider problems, oversight and enforcement, and use of second-
generation strategies), and applied them to four case studies. This
exercise demonstrated that self-regulation, undergirded by law (as is
the case in negotiated agreements such as Project XL and regulatory
negotiations, and as is the case in a statutory safe harbor) is a more
effective and efficient instrument than either voluntary codes (which,
lacking government oversight and enforcement, are often too lax) or
prescriptive regulation (which, lacking industry input and expertise,
may be too inflexible and inefficient). In a nutshell, well-designed safe
harbors enable policy makers to imagine new forms of self-regulation
that "build on its strengths . . . while compensating for its
weaknesses."233 This embrace of statutory safe harbors and a
discussion of privacy covenants as a transitional regulatory
instrument led to a discussion of three specific proposals for
improving privacy self-regulation. Rather than summarizing these
proposals as described in Part IV, this Article concludes with a set of
specific recommendations to Congress as it considers privacy
legislation in the coming years.
The first recommendation is that Congress includes a provision in
any new bill permitting experimental privacy XL projects. Specifically,
the provision should authorize the FTC to negotiate covenants with
firms modifying or relaxing fair information practices in exchange for
enforceable promises to achieve better results in one or more areas
covered by the legislation (such as transparency, individual
participation, purpose specifications, data minimization, use
limitations, data quality and integrity, security, or accountability and
auditing) using new approaches to data governance, innovative
technologies, or other best practices. Allowing the FTC and the
relevant stakeholders to identify and experiment with worthy projects
within the XL framework is likely to yield better results than if
Congress itself selects interesting ideas and obliges the FTC to report
on them in a fixed timeframe.234
233 See Gunningham & Rees, supra note 6, at 389.
234 See, e.g., CAN-SPAM Act, i5 U.S.C. § ro8 (requiring the FITC to report on the
feasibility of a Do-Not-Email Registry); see also 15 U.S.C. § 771o (requiring the FTC to
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The second recommendation is that any new law based on FIPPs
should include a safe harbor program echoing the COPPA safe harbor
to the extent that it encourages groups to submit self-regulatory
guidelines and, if approved by the FTC, that it treats compliance with
these guidelines as deemed compliance with statutory requirements.
The FTC should be granted APA rulemaking powers to implement
necessary rules, including a safe harbor rule. Congress should also
consider whether to mandate negotiated rulemaking for a behavioral
advertising safe harbor. In any case, the FTC should give serious
thought to using the negotiated rulemaking process in developing a
safe harbor program or approving specific guidelines. Alternatively,
the safe harbor rule should require applicants to demonstrate that
they have engaged in stakeholder consultation by describing, for
example, who is affected by the proposed safe harbor program, what
efforts the applicant has taken to consult with affected groups
(including the period of time allowed for such consultations), any
changes to the proposed safe harbor guidelines resulting from these
consultations, and a summary of any issues that remain unresolved
and why.235
In addition, the COPPA-style safe harbor program should be
overhauled to reflect second-generation strategies. Specifically, the
statute should articulate default requirements but allow the FTC more
discretion in determining whether proposed industry guidelines
achieve desired outcomes, without firms having to match detailed
regulatory requirements on a point-by-point basis. Additionally, the
enforcement provision should include new incentives such as tiered
liability and lighter regulatory burdens for firms that qualify for safe
harbor treatment. 2 36 Finally, because performance measures for
privacy remain an underdeveloped area with scant literature
describing these measures or their usefulness in predicting superior
performance, the FTC should at the very least be encouraged to
report on a "bounty" system for rewarding members of the public who help catch
spammers and the use of "ADV" labeling in subject lines to help identify commercial
emails).
235 See Legislative Hearing Examining H.R. 5777, the BEST PRACTICES Act, and the
Boucher-Stearns Discussion Draft Before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and
Consumer Protection of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. (2010)
(testimony of Ira Rubinstein), available at
http://republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/Media/file/Hearings/CTCP/o72210_CTC
PBestPractices/Rubinstein.Testimony.pdf.
236 The Choice Program in the recently introduced Rush bill adopts a very similar
approach. See Best Practices Act, supra note 15 at § 401(3).
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support non-governmental efforts to develop appropriate measures of
privacy performance.

